A California Federal Court Dismisses Computer Class Action

In Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2009 WL 3021240 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009), the court packed a lot of legal issues into a short opinion.

The plaintiff brought a putative class action, claiming that HP's laptop computers have a defect in the power jack's attachment to the motherboard that causes the solder connection to be interrupted, resulting in the ultimate failure of the laptops.  Initially, plaintiff brought the putative class action in state court alleging that an "abnormally high" number of such laptops were defective, and representing that the individual class members' claims were under $75,000 and that the aggregate liability was under $5 million.  Subsequently, they amended the complaint to allege that all HP laptops of certain models had the defect.  HP removed to federal court under CAFA 129 days after the filing of the original complaint, and plaintiff moved to remand.  The court retained jurisdiction, finding that HP had been justified in relying upon the monetary allegations in the initial complaint to refrain from investigating whether the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.

The court also granted defendant's motion to dismiss, giving plaintiffs leave to amend.  Plaintiffs had pled three causes of action:  California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, and breach of warranty.

The court held that the allegations at issue did not impose upon the defendant any duty to disclose under the CLRA, noting that the alleged defect did not involve a risk of physical injury.

It also held that the allegations were insufficient to state a UCL claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Although the complaint alleged violation of ten statutory prohibitions, it gave no facts as to how those prohibitions were violated.  Moreover, the court held that the following statements were non-actionable puffery:  that laptops are designed to "'perform . . . flawlessly,'" that they provide "'easy-to-use technology'" and that they "'enable greater mobility and resource sharing within homes or small offices.'"  Id. at *2.

The court also held that the breach of warranty claim failed because plaintiff's computer failed after the running of the two-year warranty period.  The court rejected plaintiff's argument that a two-year warranty period was unconscionable.

One disappointing bit of dictum in the Wilson decision is the court's statement that, at the pleading stage, California's UCL constitutionally could apply to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs because the defendant's actions and representations are alleged to have emanated from California.  The decision, however, engages in no conflict of laws analysis and fails to consider any of the large number of decisions that refuse to apply the law of the defendant's residence to facilitate a class action.

 

Judge Debevoise Issues Excellent Puffery Opinion in Toshiba HD DVD MDL

It's not every day an MDL transferee dismisses the entire litigation on the pleadings.  Too often their job is viewed as assembling a document depository and presiding over copious amounts of discovery.  But some cases are just meant to die with the pleadings -- even where there are enough of the cases to warrant creating an MDL.

Judge Dickinson Debevoise has served in the District of New Jersey for nearly 30 years, and for almost half of that time he has been the court's senior member.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that he, as an MDL transferee judge, exhibited no reticence whatsoever in dismissing a consolidated class action complaint on the pleadings where the statements that formed the bedrock of the litigation were obvious puffery.

In In re Toshiba HD DVD Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 2009 WL 2940081 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2009), the plaintiffs alleged that Toshiba had misled customers by not disclosing that it was going to throw in the towel in the high-def DVD format war it was waging against Sony's Blu-ray technology.  They claimed that months, if not years, before the company's decision to discontinue making its HD DVD players, the company knew that most of the Hollywood studios had embraced Sony's technology and that it was just a matter of time before Toshiba would be forced to abandon the field to Blu-ray, much as Betamax abandoned the field to VHS.  Plaintiffs alleged that, had they known this fact, they would not have paid a premium price above ordinary DVD players to buy Toshiba's HD DVD players. They alleged 4 causes of action:  (1) violation of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of express and implied warranties, and (4) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

In deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), refusing to credit plaintiffs' legal conclusions or other "threadbare recitals of a cause of action."  Rather, it demanded factual allegations, and found the plaintiffs' complaint lacking.

In analyzing the New Jersey CFA, the court looked first to the affirmative acts that were pled, namely, "(1) representing that HD DVD offered the best of high-definition television and DVD; and (2) representing that HD DVD was a format for today, tomorrow, and beyond, and that Toshiba was committed to supporting the HD DVD format into the future."  Id. at *9.  The court held that these were not actionable misrepresentations of fact, but rather were mere puffery, i.e., subjective statements of opinion.  In so holding, the court was mindful of how widely publicized the war between the HD DVD and Blu Ray formats was:

It defies logic that a consumer would believe, based on the tag line "For Today, Tomorrow and Beyond" that Toshiba was committed to producing HD DVD Players indefinitely, particularly given the well-publicized format war with Blu-ray, wherein both Sony and Toshiba were trying to capture the next generation DVD market.

Id. at *10.  The court concluded that the complaint failed

"to allege sufficient facts to claim that an 'ordinary' consumer -- who they admit would have been aware of the format war between HD DVD and Blu-ray -- would have expected to remain in the market indefinitely regardless of the implications of doing so.  On the contrary, the numerous articles referenced in the [complaint] provide support for the notion that the struggle to capture the next generation DVD market was seen as a winner-take-all battle.

Id.

Plaintiffs also asserted two basic "omissions" that Toshiba failed to warn consumers about:  (1) that "major motion pictures would not be released on HD DVD," and (2) that Toshiba planned to withdraw its support from HD DVD technology by exiting the market.  The court once again relied upon the many articles describing the format war between Sony and Toshiba, which "was characterized as a battle which would result in only the 'winning' format continuing in the marketplace."  Id. at 12.  The court said that it "defies logic" that Toshiba's potential market withdrawal could have been concealed in the face of such articles.

Besides puffery, the court held that the New Jersey CFA claim failed because plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts under Rule 9(b) to establish an ascertainable loss and causation; they failed to plead where they bought the players, how much they paid, how much ordinary DVD players cost, and whether plaintiffs were ever exposed to the alleged misrepresentations and made their decision because of those misrepresentations.

With respect to the unjust enrichment count, the court held that plaintiffs failed to plead it adequately because they got exactly what they paid for:  a DVD player that played HD DVDs at a higher quality than ordinary DVDs.  The court noted that Toshiba did not control the fact that movie studios opted for Blu-ray technology, and it relied on the fact that the format war was well-publicized.

With respect to the express warranty claim, the court held that the statement "Today, Tomorrow and Beyond" did not create an express warranty and was, in fact, puffery.  Similarly, on the implied warranty claim, the court noted that for an implied warranty of merchantability to be breached, the product actually has to be defective or not be fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended.  The complaint does not allege that the players fail to work, but merely that third parties have stopped providing new DVDs in that format.  Thus, it does not allege a breach of implied warranty claim.

Finally, the court held that because there was no implied warranty claim under state law, there could be no Magnuson Moss claim under federal law.

Judge Debevoise's opinion is important not only for its recognition that the statements at issue were mere puffery, but also because it recognizes the context in which consumers were making their choices.  Where the format war was obvious and consumers could be expected to pay attention to it in making their selection, any basic statement in support of the superiority of that technology could not be actionable.  The court refused to impose on a company fighting for the survival of its product line a legal duty to broadcast to consumers (and competitors) that it was considering exiting the market in a period of months.

 

 

California Court Revives Advertising Claims, Finding No Preemption

California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an opinion last Monday that illustrates once again why splitting the baby is never a satisfying result.  See Paduano v. American Honda Motor Co., 2009 WL 57806 (Cal. App. Jan. 12, 2009).  The case was straightforward enough:  plaintiff bought a hybrid car expecting it to get 51 miles per gallon, which was what the brochure said was the EPA’s fuel economy estimate for manual transmission versions of the car.  But the car didn’t come close.  Instead, it averaged roughly 30 miles per gallon when plaintiff drove the car.  Apparently EPA’s method of testing hybrid cars differs substantially from how some drivers typically drive them, so that the EPA estimates can be significantly better than actual experience.

Plaintiff sued for breach of one federal and two state warranty statutes, as well as for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and its Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”).

The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims, finding, inter alia, that they were preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act.  The Court of Appeal, however, affirmed dismissal of the warranty claims, but reversed on the UCL and CLRA claims, holding that they were not preempted.

The court was right to affirm dismissal of the warranty claims because Honda clearly made no warranty about the EPA’s fuel economy estimate.  Rather, the label stated – as required by federal law – “ACTUAL MILEAGE will vary with options, driving conditions, driving habits and vehicle’s conditions.”  And 49 U.S.C. § 32908(d) “clearly provides that ‘[a] disclosure about fuel economy or estimate annual fuel costs under this section does not establish a warranty under the law of the United States or a State.’”  Id. at *7.

Ultimately, however, the majority held that the plaintiff’s UCL and CLRA claims were not preempted.  In doing so, it applied a presumption against preemption from the California Supreme Court’s “colored salmon” case:  Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1087-88 (2008), cert. denied sub nom., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kanter, 2009 WL 56199 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2009).  Paduano, 2009 WL 57806 at *12-*13.  It then applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Altria Group v. Good, 2008 WL 5204477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2008) to hold that the language of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act does not expressly preempt the plaintiff’s claims.  Paduano, 2009 WL 57806 at *15.  Because the UCL and the CLRA are laws of general applicability that are not based specifically on the disclosure of fuel economy or fuel operating costs, the court held that the federal act’s express preemption provision did not apply.

The majority then found that there might be viable UCL and CLRA claims arising out of two statements from the defendant’s sales brochure:  (1)  “Just drive the Hybrid like you would a conventional car and save on fuel bills,” and (2) “IS THERE ANYTHING SPECIAL I HAVE TO DO?  You just have to love saving money and getting terrific gas mileage.”   Id. at *10-*11.

As Justice Terry O’Rourke points out in the dissent, these statements are “mere unspecific, nonfactual assertions constituting non-actionable puffery.”  Id. at *32-*33.  And the first statement, taken in context, is actually just differentiating this Hybrid from an electric car the owner would have to plug in to charge.  Id. at *23.

But more important, Justice O’Rourke makes it plain that the plaintiff’s sole theory of liability is premised exclusively on the EPA’s mileage estimate, and that the sought-after relief – eliminating or reducing the EPA’s mileage estimate –  actually was expressly preempted by the federal statute because it would impose a legal obligation “related to fuel economy standards.”  Id. at *25.  The Supreme Court’s recent Good decision, Justice O’Rourke explains, is wholly irrelevant to the issue at hand.

The majority and dissenting opinions in Paduano highlight the difficulty of consistently applying the Supreme Court’s preemption precedents.  There is much too much detail in the two sides’ positions to analyze in this blog post.  But certain fundamental questions – such as when to apply the presumption against preemption, and when does a statute of general applicability “impose” obligations within the meaning of an express preemption provision – clearly remain hotly disputed.  One hopes the California Supreme Court will accept review of Paduano, which seems certain to be appealed, and provide some additional clarity in this area.

 

CSPI Files Consumer Fraud Class Action Claiming Vitamin Water Isn't "Healthy" Because It Contains Sugar

The nation’s self-appointed nanny, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”), truly outdid itself last week, filing a class action lawsuit in San Francisco federal court to “protect” Californians from Vitamin Water, which CSPI blames, in part, for America’s "obesity epidemic."  What could possibly be wrong with Vitamin Water, you ask? Not the FDA-required nutritional information on the label, apparently.  CSPI concedes that it accurately reflects the amount of vitamins and other ingredients in this line of beverages.

The fraud – according to CSPI – is that the beverages also contain sugar, while the label and the marketing touts the possible energy and health benefits of the other added ingredients.  Of course, both the amount of sugar and the amount of calories are squarely stated in the “Nutrition Facts” on the label.  And although the beverages do not purport to be “Sugar Free” or “Diet,” they do taste sweet, which should give the calorie-conscious consumer some clue to check the label for sugar content and calories.

Although CSPI claims throughout the complaint that the beverages are “misbranded” and marketed in a “false,” “misleading” and “deceptive” manner in violation of California’s Unfair Competition law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), its Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750) and its False Advertising Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500), the simple fact is this:  the complaint never identifies a single false, misleading or deceptive statement, nor can it truthfully say that the calories or sugar content of these beverages are concealed from the consumer.

The complaint suffers from too many infirmities to list here.  In the unjust enrichment count, it asks for class members to get their money back even though they received the benefit they paid for, drank it, and can’t return it to the defendant.  The complaint also pleads fraud with no particularity whatsoever.  It does not limit the class definition to purchases that were made in California, thus creating choice of law problems.  And it premises liability on satirical marketing copy – such as “this combination of zinc and fortifying vitamins can . . . keep you healthy as a horse” – that obviously would be puffery under California law.  See, e.g., Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1361 (Cal. App. 2003) (“boasts” and “meaningless superlatives” that are not “factual representations that a given standard is met” are akin to puffing and are not actionable).

CSPI’s grandstanding lawsuit against one of America’s most respected product manufacturers – which it filed with two for-profit plaintiffs’ firms as co-counsel – is precisely the sort of abuse of legal process that gives consumer fraud class actions a bad name.
 

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