Another Federal Court Denies Class Certification Where Class Is Overbroad

A recent tobacco decision out of the Northern District of Illinois highlights the importance of challenging the class definition in the defense of consumer fraud cases.  in Cleary v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2010 WL 680957 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2010), plaintiffs had brought three different class actions against the tobacco industry.  One was for illegal underage smoking, one was for nicotene addiction, and one was for allegedly deceptively marketing "low tar," "light," and "ultra light" cigarettes as safer than other cigarettes.

Because of summary judgments that previously had been granted, the first two classes failed for lack of a representative plaintiff.  But the court considered the class certification motion for the "light" cigarettes case.

The class was defined expansively:  "persons who purchased and consumed Marlboro Lights in Illinois 'from the time such cigarettes were placed into the stream of commerce until the date that the defendant publicly and adequately disclosed to consumers the true nature and effect of these cigarettes."  Id. at *1. 

The court found that the complaint met the numerosity and commonality requirements of Rule 23(a), but it failed to meet the typicality requirement for two reasons.  First, the plaintiff did not explain how he intended to demonstrate that he suffered an injury from defendant's alleged fraud and how that was typical of the class members.  Second -- and more important -- the court focused on the overbreadth of plaintiff's class definition.

As the court explained:

Class C is defined so broadly that it is likely to include persons who suffered no detriment at all due to Philip Morris's conduct.  Some class members may have purchased Marlboro Lights for reasons wholly unrelated to its purportedly less-unhealthy qualities--for example, because they preferred the flavor of other brands.  And other class members may have purchased Marlboro Lights despite being completely unaware of claimed differences between the adverse effects of "light" cigarettes and other, non-"light" brands.   It is not entirely clear where Cleary fits in along this spectrum.  Though it is true, as Cleary points out, that factual differences among the claims of class members do not necessarily defeat typicality, the likelihood that some significant proportion of class members experienced no injury at all does, at least in a case like this one in which proof of detriment is a necessary element of the claim. 

Id. at *4 (citation omitted).

Whether the court treats it as part of the element of typicality, as the Cleary court did here, or whether it treats it as a fundamental problem with the class definition, "overbreadth" (i.e., including within the class people who were uninjured by the product) presents serious problems that go to the core of who is going to be bound by the verdict and how the proof is going to establish classwide truths.  That is why courts increasingly are denying class certification to overbroad classes.

Federal Court Rejects CAFA Removal Because Plaintiff Is Uninjured and Thus Lacks Standing

Reading National Consumers League v. General Mills, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-10881 (HHK), Slip op. (D.D.C.  Jan 15, 2010) will make you feel as if you have fallen through the looking glass.  In this case, the National Consumers League ("NCL") sued General Mills for alleged misrepresentations about the cholesterol-lowering properties of Cheerios.  The NCL brought suit under DC's Consumer Protection Procedures Act ("CPPA") for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, the "greater of 'treble damages or statutory damages in the amount of $1,500 per violation,'" and attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.  Id. at 2.  General Mills removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. 

So far, so good.  Sounds positively ordinary, right?  Hang on.

The NCL made an emergency motion to remand, arguing that it had suffered no injury and thus lacked the Article III standing necessary to pursue a claim in federal court.

Yes, that's right.  Plaintiff stipulated that it had suffered no injury and lacked standing.

How can a plaintiff do that and avoid ruining its prospects of pursuing its claim in "state" court, too?  Indeed, don't state courts have standing rules that prevent the adjudication of "hypothetical" disputes and require a plaintiff to have injury and causation in order to establish a justiciable case or controversy?  Nearly all do.  Indeed, most people would have thought that DC courts, which are statutorily authorized to adjudicate only "cases or controversies" (D.C. Code sec. 11-705), have standing requirements as well.  See, e.g., Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1160 (D.C. 1991); Cmty. Credit Union Servs . v. Fed. Express Servs. Corp., 534 A.2d 331, 333 (D.C. 1987).

Unfortunately, however, the District of Columbia held last year that the District's courts are "not required to abide by any of the constitutional or traditional standing principles that apply in federal courts 'when the [D.C.] Council has provided the cause of action.'"  Archis A. Parasharami and Kevin Ranlett, The Nation's New Lawsuit Capital?  D.C. High Court Eliminates Standing Requirements for Consumer Protection Lawsuits, Threatening Flood of Abusive Litigation, vol. 9, no. 20, Mealey's Litigation Report:  Class Actions (Dec. 17, 2009) (discussing Grayson v. AT&T Corp.., 980 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2009)).  The DC Council had amended the CPPA in 2000 to allow any person to bring an action on behalf of the general public.  Accordingly, the NCL was free to escape federal court by arguing that it had no injury because the District appears not require an injury for private attorneys general asserting CPPA claims.

The federal court in National Consumers League could have stopped there, but it didn't.  It also opined that the case was not removable as a "mass action" under CAFA because it fell into the exception of being a non-removable suit "brought on behalf of the general public."  Slip. op. at 8-9.  This conclusion seems suspect, however, given that the suit seeks -- in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief -- damages, which the court stated were not payable to the uninjured plaintiff, but instead only to those consumers who had been actually harmed.  Id. at 9-10.  At least with the damages portion of the suit, then, the plaintiff (NCL) is representing a subset of the general public:   Cheerios consumers who were actually injured by the defendant's alleged misconduct and can collect damages.  That sounds much more like a "mass action" or "class action" than a suit on behalf of the "general public."  Nevertheless, the court mandated remand to DC Superior Court.

The result in National Consumers League highlights the potential for a disturbing trend:  unscrupulous litigants may file CPPA claims in DC Superior Court seeking damages for other people and, by disclaiming any injury themselves, effectively avoid CAFA's clear purpose of having such suits adjudicated in federal courts.  That can hardly be what Congress intended when it enacted CAFA.  And I continue to find it difficult to believe that it really is the law in the District of Columbia.