UPDATE: Federal Court Won't Throw Out Nutella

Yesterday I opined that consumer fraud litigation against the maker of Nutella was frivolous because the amount of saturated fats, the calorie count, and the fact that Nutella contains sugar were all disclosed on the label of the product.  As such, a consumer's purported reliance on advertising puffery about Nutella being part of a healthy breakfast to conclude otherwise was per se unreasonable, I harrumphed.

Late last night Bryan Redding at Lexis Nexis wrote me about a decision that came up online just as my post went up, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.  There's also an article about it at Product Liability Law360.  Apparently basic fraud law does not apply in the People's Republic of California, I lamented.  But perhaps I was too quick to reach an opinion on the subject.

In In re Ferrero Litigation, Case No. 11-CV-205-H (CAB), Slip op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011), the defendant argued that plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not identified a "long-term" advertising campaign for Nutella.  The TV campaign, the defendant said, had only begun in 2009.  

Citing the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009), the court opined that the plaintiffs did not need to identify with specificity the misrepresentations they relied on where they alleged exposure to a long-term advertising campaign.  Slip op. at 3.  Because there was a dispute as to whether such a long-term campaign existed -- and the complaint alleged that it did -- the court gave the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt and denied the motion to dismiss, observing that issue could be one upon which the defendant would prevail on summary judgment or at class certification.

The court also held that the UCL allegations met the Rule 9(b) pleading standard by identifying specific statements in the advertisements that were part of the "long-term" advertising campaign and explaining how they are allegedly deceptive.  Slip op. at 4.

Interestingly, the defendant's motion does not appear to have argued that there can be no deception as a matter of law where the label itself discloses the ingredients, calories, and the amount of saturated fats.  Of course, I have posted previously about decisions holding that where the product contains the ingredients listed on the label, mere advertising puffery describing the product as "healthy" is not enough to sustain a consumer fraud claim. 

We'll see if Ferrarro ultimately is successful in getting these putative class actions dismissed.  Maybe, maybe not.  But I stand behind my belief that the JPML, in concluding that these cases did not present complicated fact issues, had in the back of its mind that this was frivolous litigation that ought to be dismissed, not consolidated into a federal MDL to manage massive pre-trial discovery.

Federal Court Rejects Nationwide Class Action Settlement

Continuing with our settlement theme, this post discusses True v. American Honda Motor Co., 2010 WL 707338 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010), in which U.S. District Judge Virginia A. Phillip ultimately rejected as unfair a class action settlement that she had preliminarily approved last August.  What changed in 6 months' time?  And can the settlement be salvaged?

Plaintiffs in True had sued Honda under California's Unfair Competition Law, the False Advertising Act, and unjust enrichment, alleging that Honda had falsely advertised the fuel economy of its Honda Civic Hybrid vehicles between 2003 and 2008 and claiming that the class had relied on these misrepresentations in paying a premium price for the vehicles.

It would appear that this is yet another one of those lawsuits that claims that the federal fuel efficiency standards that are required to be posted on new vehicles require certain kinds of driving for hybrid vehicles that some people may not understand actually promotes fuel efficiency, so that when they buy the car and drive it as they would other non-hybrid vehicles, they do not achieve the same fuel efficiency as the advertised performance using the federal standard.

After 11 months of discovery, the parties engaged in mediation and negotiated a nationwide class action settlement that the District Court preliminarily approved.  Notice went out to the class.  Ultimately, there were a number of objectors and a coalition of 25 state Attorneys General that filed oppositions to the initial proposed settlement.  The parties modified the settlement to meet many of the objections, and then moved for final approval by the District Court.

The proposed settlement did not create a settlement fund, but instead created certain categories of relief for class members.  Every class member would receive a DVD that Honda would produce that would demonstrate how to maximize the fuel efficiency of their hybrid vehicles.  Class members also could receive one of two rebates.  Option A gave a $1,000 cash rebate to those who sell their Civic Hybrid and trade it in on an eligible Honda vehicle.  Option B gave a $500 cash rebate to those who kept their Civic Hybrid and bought another eligible Honda vehicle.  In addition, a small subset of class members could receive a $100 cash payment, but only if they complained to their dealer or Honda and the dealer or Honda kept a written record of it. Finally, there was "injunctive" relief requiring Honda to change the advertising phrase "actual mileage may vary" to "actual mileage will vary."

The proposed settlement provided a full release to Honda of all claims relating to the fuel economy of the Civic Hybrid, and it allowed for incentive payments of $10,000 and $12,500 to the named plaintiffs, respectively.  Plaintiffs' counsel sought an award of $2,950,000, which Honda did not oppose.

Judge Phillip held that the class met the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements of Rule 23, but it failed the adequacy of representation requirement because the two named plaintiffs were part of the small subset of class members who would receive an actual $100 cash payment.  This presented an inherent conflict with the other class members, the court explained.  The court also held that the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met.

In assessing the fairness and adequacy of the settlement, the court challenged whether the sub-class of people who received a cash payment was fair at all.  They had no stronger or weaker legal claims than anyone else in the class.  And whether the defendants kept a record of their complaints was not in their control.  The court concluded that "the settlement here draws an arbitrary distinction among class members with identical claims and injuries, and allows some to receive a cash award, and others only a DVD and a limited rebate.  This is patently unfair, and counsels against approval of the proposed settlement."  Id. at *11.

The court also assessed the value of the rebates, noting that this is a coupon settlement that is generally disfavored.  The court analyzed whether the value of the settlement was reasonable in relation to the value of the class claims.

The court determined that the plaintiffs had reasonably strong claims.  It rejected the defendant's preemption defense, discounted the issue of whether California law could apply to a nationwide class, and then proceeded to discuss how strong the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) was for the class.  The court did acknowledge, however, that a number of class members had objected to the settlement, indicating that they were pleased with their Honda Civic Hybrids and had achieved the mileage that Honda had advertised.  Id. at *15.  Indeed, the "majority of class members who opted-out . . . cited their satisfaction with the gas mileage they were receiving from their HCHs, or otherwise opposed the merits of the suit."  Id. at *23.

The court rejected the conclusions of plaintiffs' expert, which had assigned monetary values to the rebates and the DVD.

The court also expressed great concern about class counsel's requested fee, noting that a "lodestar amount is particularly inappropriate where, as here, the benefit achieved for the class is small and the lodestar award is large."  Id. at 20.  The court also expressed concern about the procedures used to negotiate the fee:

The size of the fee request also raises concerns in light of the fact that it was negotiated at the same time as the substantive relief to the class.  "Ordinarily, 'a defendant is interested only in disposing of the total claim asserted against it . . . the allocation between the class payment and the attorneys' fees is of little or no interest to the defense.'" . . .

Here, of all of the components of the settlement, the only components with any determinative value are the attorneys' fees and incentive payments.  Under the terms of the settlement, there is no certainty that class members will receive any cash payments or rebates at all, but class counsel will receive a three million dollar payment regardless of whether one or 10,000 class members file valid claims.  Since there is no guarantee that [Honda] will pay any money out of the settlement to either class members or a cy pres beneficiary, to award three million dollars to class counsel who may have achieved no financial recovery for the class would be unconscionable.

Id. at *21 (citations omitted).

As a result of its analysis, the court concluded that the value of the settlement weighed against approval.

The decision in True demonstrates the continuing difficulty of obtaining approval of coupon settlements, even for weak claims that have little, if any, merit.

Merck Wins Important Post-Tobacco II Appeal in UCL Class Action

Yesterday Merck won an important appeal in a California Vioxx class action in which plaintiffs had argued that the California Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) required the reversal of a trial court's refusal to certify a class action under California's Unfair Competition Law.  See In re Vioxx Class Cases, No. B216521 (Cal. App. -- 2d Dist. Dec. 15, 2009).  The Vioxx Class Cases decision is important because it recognizes that although Tobacco II imposed a new understanding of the UCL's standing requirement, it did not fundamentally alter the other elements of the statute, and a proposed class can still fail the class action prerequisites where the relief requested requires individualized determinations and where the named plaintiffs' claims are not typical of those of other class members.

Vioxx was a Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug ("NSAID") that was used to treat pain until it was removed from the market in 2004.  Unlike aspirin or naproxen, which are NSAIDs that can cause gastrointestinal complications, Vioxx was a "COX-2" inhibitor that was expressly designed to avoid the gastrointestinal effects inherent in NSAIDs like naproxen.  Vioxx was removed from the market after studies determined that it presented a risk of adverse cardiovascular effects.

Plaintiffs brought a statewide class action under the UCL, the False Advertising Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and common law unjust enrichment.  They sought classwide restitution of the difference in price between what they paid for Vioxx and what they would have paid for a safer, equally effective, pain reliever.  Their economist calculated that price differential to be $8.3 billion nationally, but did not break it down to what allegedly was owed to California purchasers.

Plaintiffs' theory of liability was simple:  Merck knew its drug presented cardiovascular risks, but concealed that fact and marketed Vioxx as safe to the public and to doctors.  Slip op. at 7.  As a result, they said, they were entitled to classwide restitution of the difference between the price of Vioxx and the price of generic naproxen.

Interestingly, in discovery, plaintiffs would not say that they would have taken naproxen instead of Vioxx.  Rather, they would only say that they would not have taken Vioxx if they had known the risks, and that the drug they would have used instead was irrelevant.  Slip op. at 6.

In the trial court, Merck had established that roughly 16,500 people in the US died from gastrointestinal bleeds -- the most common NSAID complication -- each year, and over 100,000 were hospitalized.  It presented medical testimony that for patients with a history of serious gastrointestinal problems who could not tolerate traditional NSAIDs, COX-2 inhibitors like Vioxx were the only appropriate option.  Further, it presented evidence from third party payors -- who were included in the class of purchasers, even though the named plaintiffs were all individuals -- establishing that some third party payors' Pharmaceutical and Therapeutics committees had studied the risks of Vioxx thoroughly and only approved the drug for use with patients who had a history of gastrointestinal disease and had first tried one or two traditional NSAIDs without success.  The third party payors' records also established that when Vioxx was removed from the market, most patients did not switch to generic NSAIDs like naproxen, but rather switched to another branded COX-2 inhibitor with a price comparable to Vioxx.

Merck also established in the trial court that doctors apply their clinical judgment to each patient's unique situation in choosing which pain medicine to prescribe, looking at eight different factors.  Merck also established that doctors rely on different sources of information, with some even rejecting out of hand research the company provides.

On appeal, plaintiffs challenged three conclusions of the trial court.  First, they challenged the trial court's conclusion that the individual plaintiffs' claims were not typical of the claims of third party payors.  Second, they said the trial court erred in concluding that individual issues of reliance barred a class action.  And third, they urged that their method of calculating damages was subject to common, class-wide proof, making classwide restitution appropriate.

Typicality and Third Party Payors

Plaintiffs argued that the individual plaintiffs could represent the interests of the third party payors -- like union health benefit plans -- because if an individual relied on Merck's alleged misrepresentations to buy Vioxx, then the third party payor who paid for most of that prescription should be entitled to recover, too.  The Court of Appeal held that the flaw in this analysis is that it treats the third party payor as a passive entity that pays without having any say in what is prescribed.  But the evidence showed that, at least for some large third party payors, their Pharmaceutical and Therapeutics committees conducted literature reviews and studies, and made their own decisions about what they were going to pay for.  As a result, evidence about what alleged misrepresentations the individuals received or relied upon could not apply to third party payors, and the court could not presume reliance across all third party payors based on any individual's reliance.  Slip op. at 21.  Indeed, for third party payors who only paid for Vioxx where there was a history of gastrointestinal problems and the patient could not tolerate other NSAIDs, every penny it paid for Vioxx was for a patient who benefited from the prescription.  Id. at 22.  Accordingly, the individuals' claims were not typical of the third party payors.

Individual Issues of Reliance Predominate the CLRA Claim

California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act requires some form of causation between the unlawful act and the consumer's damages:  it gives a cause of action to "[a]ny consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment" of an unlawful act.  Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1780(a) (emphasis added).  Some California cases have held that an "inference of reliance" may arise for the class where a material misrepresentation has been made to the whole class.  But "if the issue of materiality or reliance is a matter that would vary from consumer to consumer, the issue is not subject to common proof, and the action is not properly certified as a class action."  Slip op. at 16.

Plaintiffs suggested that hiding an increased risk of death from cardiovascular complications is about as material as a misrepresentation can get, and that reliance should be inferred to the whole class for purposes of the CLRA.  But the Court of Appeal rejected this notion for four reasons.

First, Vioxx did not present an increased risk of death for all patients, because there were patients with gastrointestinal problems who would have been more likely to die from complications with traditional NSAIDs like naproxen.  Second, the record evidence reflected that there were patients who would still take Vioxx if it were on the market today, and physicians who would still prescribe it.  Thus, for some subset of the class, the cardiovascular risks were not material to their decision whether to take the medicine.  Third, the differences in how doctors study and evaluate the risks of medicines prevented a classwide inference of materiality.  And fourth, the patient-specific factors that doctors evaluate in prescribing a pain medicine also made a presumption of materiality not viable.  For example, a doctor might downplay the clotting risk of Vioxx for a patient already receiving a blood thinner like Coumadin.  Slip op. at 24. 

Individual Issues Regarding Injury and Restitution Predominate the UCL and FAA Claims

The Court of Appeal noted that although the UCL liberalizes the standards for finding liability, it narrowly prescribes the remedies available under the statute:  injunctive relief and restitution.  There was no need for injunctive relief, since the product had been pulled from the market.  So the question was one of restitution.  Plaintiffs' economist proposed comparing the price of Vioxx with the price of generic naproxen, using the difference as the amount of restitution. 

But the Court of Appeal concluded that this approach could not be applied to the class as a whole, because there was substantial record evidence that after Vioxx was withdrawn from the market, most Vioxx patients switched to other similarly-priced brand-name COX-2 inhibitors, not generic naproxen.  Plaintiffs argued that adjudicating the validity of naproxen as a comparison improperly went to the merits of the action, but the Court of Appeal said no.  Rather, it went to whether a "measurable amount" of restitution could be proven on a classwide basis.  The court held that it could not, and that class members thus would have to individually establish the appropriate comparator medicine, and then whether he suffered an injury.  This was a patient-specific issue, the court held, "incorporating the patient's medical history, treatment needs, and drug interactions."

Dicta on the Class Definition

The Court of Appeal was highly critical of the plaintiffs' class definition, which included "all individuals or entities in California who . . . paid some or all of the purchase price for the prescription drug Vioxx."  Slip op. at 6-7.  Besides improperly lumping individuals and third party payors together, the Court of Appeal also was clearly troubled that there was no carve-out for people who suffered physical injuries (slip op. at 5-6, n.4), thereby presenting problems of claim-splitting.  The court said the class definition was overbroad, and that those with physical injuries "should not be bound in an action pursuing only economic damages for the price of Vioxx."  Slip op. at 20, n.16.  Moreover, the class definition also was overbroad because it included those with flat co-payment obligations who would have paid the same amount of co-payment regardless of what drug was applied; they would have suffered no injury, and thus should not be in the class.  Id. 

Moreover, given the fact that -- as the Court of Appeal noted -- many of the class members actually derived benefit from Vioxx's lack of gastrointestinal effects, I would argue that the class definition also should have been required to exclude those people from the class.

The decision in Vioxx Class Cases is an important reminder that the elements of the causes of action for UCL, CLRA, FAA and unjust enrichment claims in California provide important defenses to class certification.  Just because a UCL claim may survive a demurrer does not mean that it can be tried on a classwide basis.  Defendants would be wise to follow Merck's lead and develop strong factual bases for why classwide presumptions are not viable and individual proof of injury should be required.

California Appeals Court Tosses UCL Claim Against Princess Cruise Lines for Plaintiffs' Lack of Reliance

Despite conventional wisdom, cruises aren't for everyone.  Roger and Vivian Wang took a two-week European cruise with their two daughters in 2005, and they ended up bringing a class action against Princess Cruise Lines over it.  Their complaint, in a nutshell, was that the cruise line allegedly overcharged for shore excursions, and the Wangs sought to represent a class of "all California residents who were passengers on cruises operated by petitioner who paid prices for shore excursions that were 'in excess of the shore excursion operator's actual price.'"

The Wangs pled five causes of action, including violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act, as well as common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  The trial court granted summary judgment on the two common law claims because the Wangs did not rely upon any alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant.  But it refused to grant summary judgment on the statutory claims, holding that such claims do not require plaintiffs to plead or prove reliance.

This week the California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory claims should have been dismissed for lack of reliance.  See Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 2009 WL 3747211 (Nov. 10, 2009).

The evidence on lack of reliance was clear.  Neither of the Wangs had spoken with the defendant prior to purchasing the cruise, nor had they read any of defendant's materials.  Moreover, Ms. Wang had told her travel agent that she wanted to go on the shore excursions whatever they cost.  Thus, not only had the plaintiffs not received any alleged misrepresentations about the price of the shore excursions from defendant, but even if they had, they would not have relied upon them in making the decision to take the shore excursions.

The Court of Appeal looked to the California Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009), which held that although absent class members do not have to meet the standing requirements imposed on the Unfair Competition Law by Proposition 64, named class representatives do.  As the Court of Appeal in Princess Cruise Lines explained, the Tobacco II decision was clear that named plaintiffs asserting a misrepresentation theory under the UCL must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly false or misleading statements.  2009 WL 3747211 at *4.  Because the Wangs had no contact with the defendant, did not read its literature, and based their decision to take the shore excursions on reasons other than representations, "there is no reason to delve into the contention that what is at issue here is a prolonged advertising campaign and that the Wangs do not have to show individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations."  Id. at *5.

The Court of Appeal also used the Tobacco II court's analysis of the phrase "as a result" to conclude that the CLRA also requires proof of actual reliance.  Id. at *7.  (The CLRA grants a cause of action to a consumer "who suffers any damage as a result of the use" of a proscribed act.)

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court should have granted summary judgment not just on the common law claims, but also on each of the statutory claims, for plaintiffs' failure to prove actual reliance.  This decision is an important application of the new standard articulated by the California Supreme Court in In re Tobacco II, and we hope to see more decisions like it in the coming months.

General Mills Wins Motion to Dismiss High Fructose Corn Syrup Class Action

As consumer fraud claims go, the high fructose corn syrup ("HFCS") claims really are scraping the bottom of the barrel.  Some activists and class action lawyers attempt to blame HFCS for the so-called "obesity epidemic," but even the activist group the Center for Science in the Public Interest has counseled that this is an "urban myth" and that "[t]here isn't a shred of evidence that HFCS is any more harmful (or healthier) than sugar."

That is why it was so satisfying to see a federal court recently use the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) to dismiss (without prejudice) an HFCS class action brought under California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  See Wright v. General Mills, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08cv1532 L(NLS), Slip op. (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009).

In Wright, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had defrauded the public by using the term "100% Natural" on its Nature Valley crunchy granola bars and chewy trail mix bars at a time in the past when they had contained HFCS.  Applying Iqbal, the court held that the following allegation from the complaint was too conclusory and speculative to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard:

As a direct result of its misleading, deceptive, untrue advertising and its unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices related to the "100% Natural" products listed above, Defendant caused Plaintiff and other members of the class to purchase, purchase more of, or pay more for, these Nature Valley products.

Slip op. at 8.  The plaintiff failed to plead facts supporting the elements of her statutory claims and, to the extent that she alleged fraud, failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that she aver "'the who, what, when, where, and how' of the misconduct charged."  Slip op. at 9.  The court, however, gave plaintiff leave to replead.

The court also held that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief failed because the defendant already had stopped using HFCS in its Nature Valley products and there were no facts pled indicating that a recurrence of the use of HFCS was likely.  Slip op. at 8.  Again, plaintiff was given leave to replead.

Interestingly, the defendant's use of the term "natural" was perfectly consistent with federal law.  As the court noted, "[t]he FDA follows a policy of not taking enforcement action charging that a product labeled as 'natural' is misbranded, as long as the product has no 'added color, synthetic substances, and flavors.'"  Slip op at 5 (citation omitted).  HFCS is not synthetic, of course.  Rather, it is made from corn.

Nevertheless, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on federal preemption.  In doing so, the court relied, in large part, on the savings clause in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990:  "Congress stated that '[t]he [NLEA] shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly preempted under section 403A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.'"  Slip op. at 3 (citation omitted).  The court reasoned that the inclusion of this clause negated any intention to occupy the field of food labeling.  Id. at 4.  The court also rejected the defendant's conflict preemption argument, finding no conflict where the FDA has deferred taking action to specifically define the term "natural."  Id.  The defendant also had asserted the defense of primary jurisdiction, asking the court to stay proceedings pending action by the FDA.  But the court concluded that the issue did not meet the criteria for invoking this prudential doctrine.

Although the court in Wright gave plaintiffs another bite at the apple, it remains to be seen whether they can truthfully plead their statutory and fraud claims with the specificity required by Iqbal.

A Single Preposition Makes Forum Selection Clause Unenforceable

There has been lots of commentary -- academic and not-so-scholarly -- about the enforceability of class action waivers.  Particularly in California, the law seems to be that such waivers typically are held unenforceable as against public policy.

On Friday, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in a consumer class action interpreting a forum selection clause.  The contract at issue did not contain a class action waiver, and the defendant was not arguing that class actions were barred under the agreement; it simply wanted the benefit of its Virginia forum.  Thus, class action waiver law should not come up in the opinion, right? Ah, if only the law were that easy.

In Doe1 v. AOL LLC, 2009 WL 103657 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2009), plaintiffs were members of an on-line service provider that was alleged to have made roughly 658,000 members' personal data (including addresses, phone numbers, credit card numbers, and internet search terms) available to the public.  Plaintiffs sued for violation of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, federal common law unjust enrichment, and a subclass of California residents sued for violations of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Act, Unfair Competition Law, Customer Records Act, and for the California common law tort of public disclosure of private facts.

The Members Agreement governing the class members' claims did not seek to bar class actions.  Rather, it provided that Virginia law governed members' claims, and it had a forum selection clause providing that "exclusive jurisdiction resides in the courts of Virginia."  The defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), and the trial court granted the motion.

The Ninth Circuit, however, chose to parse prepositions.  The forum selection clause says "courts of Virginia," not "courts in Virginia."  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, despite the protestations of the defendant that presumably authored the Members Agreement, the forum selection clause only allows for actions to be brought in the state courts of Virginia, not those federal courts that exist within Virginia's borders.

This presents a problem, the Ninth Circuit concluded, because Virginia state courts do not allow for consumer class actions.  The court then used the test set forth in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) to determine whether the forum selection clause is unenforceable:  "'if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision.'"

The analysis was hardly difficult.  The California Court of Appeal already had concluded that the exact same forum selection clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy favoring class actions, and it amounted to a disfavored waiver of rights under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  See America Online, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Alameda County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. App. 2001).

Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Bremen test had been met, and the "forum selection clause in the instant member agreement is unenforceable as to California resident plaintiffs bringing class action claims under California consumer law."  Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the trial court's decision.

Judge Bea filed a concurrence arguing that on remand, the plaintiff class representatives should have to plead and prove that they "really are California consumers by stating facts which make California substantive law applicable to them, pursuant to the well-known rules of federal choice of law, set forth in the Restatement."  According to Judge Bea, "it doesn't really require one to be 'imaginative and creative' to suspect the class representatives may not have become California residents for reasons other than class action litigation and are not really California consumers entitled to California protection."

CSPI Files Consumer Fraud Class Action Claiming Vitamin Water Isn't "Healthy" Because It Contains Sugar

The nation’s self-appointed nanny, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”), truly outdid itself last week, filing a class action lawsuit in San Francisco federal court to “protect” Californians from Vitamin Water, which CSPI blames, in part, for America’s "obesity epidemic."  What could possibly be wrong with Vitamin Water, you ask? Not the FDA-required nutritional information on the label, apparently.  CSPI concedes that it accurately reflects the amount of vitamins and other ingredients in this line of beverages.

The fraud – according to CSPI – is that the beverages also contain sugar, while the label and the marketing touts the possible energy and health benefits of the other added ingredients.  Of course, both the amount of sugar and the amount of calories are squarely stated in the “Nutrition Facts” on the label.  And although the beverages do not purport to be “Sugar Free” or “Diet,” they do taste sweet, which should give the calorie-conscious consumer some clue to check the label for sugar content and calories.

Although CSPI claims throughout the complaint that the beverages are “misbranded” and marketed in a “false,” “misleading” and “deceptive” manner in violation of California’s Unfair Competition law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), its Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750) and its False Advertising Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500), the simple fact is this:  the complaint never identifies a single false, misleading or deceptive statement, nor can it truthfully say that the calories or sugar content of these beverages are concealed from the consumer.

The complaint suffers from too many infirmities to list here.  In the unjust enrichment count, it asks for class members to get their money back even though they received the benefit they paid for, drank it, and can’t return it to the defendant.  The complaint also pleads fraud with no particularity whatsoever.  It does not limit the class definition to purchases that were made in California, thus creating choice of law problems.  And it premises liability on satirical marketing copy – such as “this combination of zinc and fortifying vitamins can . . . keep you healthy as a horse” – that obviously would be puffery under California law.  See, e.g., Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1361 (Cal. App. 2003) (“boasts” and “meaningless superlatives” that are not “factual representations that a given standard is met” are akin to puffing and are not actionable).

CSPI’s grandstanding lawsuit against one of America’s most respected product manufacturers – which it filed with two for-profit plaintiffs’ firms as co-counsel – is precisely the sort of abuse of legal process that gives consumer fraud class actions a bad name.
 

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