Federal Court Finds CAFA Doesn't Preclude Settling Bull$h#& Cases for Nuisance Value, But It Should Limit Class Counsel's Fee Award

Last week District Judge Jeremy Fogel approved the combined settlement of three class actions involving Hewlett Packard printers.  See In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation, 2011 WL 1158635 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011).  All three of them were bull$h#& cases.  The first challenged HP's practice of having "low on ink" warnings and graphics appear on the printer's screen before the ink cartridge had completely run dry.  The second challenged the printers' use of "more expensive" color ink under black ink to improve the print quality of black type and images.  And the third challenged HP's use of an expiration date on certain printer cartridges.

The court consistently referred to the cases as "weak" throughout its settlement opinion.  See, e.g., id. at *1 (the court had denied summary judgment, describing the evidence of injury as "weak," and had denied certification of a litigation class), *1 (it had granted a motion to dismiss most claims in the second action), *2 (it had granted a motion to dismiss a number of claims in the third action).

The cases also had dragged on for years.  Indeed, class counsel claimed to have incurred more than $7 million in fees for some 17,000 hours' work on the cases, including 12 depositions, review of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, more than 100 written discovery requests, and extensive expert work, inter alia.  Id. at *9.

Despite what class counsel had sunk into the case, they proposed a settlement in which the defendant agreed not to challenge a fee award of only $2.9 million, which included some $600,000 in costs.  This is perhaps the best evidence that even class counsel believed these cases were crap.

The problem facing the district court was that the settlement itself did not provide much value to the class, which was estimated to have more than 13 million members.  The settlement set up a mechanism for class members to register online for e-credits at HP's website of up to $2, $5, or $6, depending on which class they belonged to.  These credits would be capped at $5 million if there were too many claimants.  (There weren't.)

The settlement also provided certain "injunctive" relief.  HP would stop using pop-up images to remind people cartridges are low on ink, and would put disclosures on its website.  The company also would include on its website disclosures about "underprinting" with color ink and have instructions for how to turn that feature off.  And it would explain on its website the intricacies of ink cartridge expiration.

The court had preliminarily approved the settlement, and the notice and opt out period ran prior to the fairness hearing.  Roughly 122,000 of the 13 million class members registered for e-credits by the deadline.  Their e-credits totalled almost $1.5 million -- substantially less than the $5 million cap.  Eight hundred opted out.  And five filed formal objections, including Ted Frank at the Center for Class Action Fairness.

The court acknowledged that most of the criticisms of the e-credits were legitimate.  They were non-transferrable, couldn't be combined with other discounts, and were redeemable only at HP.com.  These facts made the e-credits of less value than cash of the same face amount.  Id. at *6.  The court also was dubious of the claim that the value of the injunctive relief was anywhere near the range of $16 million to $41 million posited by class counsel.  Id. at *6-*7.

Nevertheless, the court approved the settlement because the value of the underlying class claims was so very low.  In citing the standards by which the settlement should be evaluated, the district court cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001) with the following description:  "approving a coupon settlement, even though it found the relief offered was 'more in the nature of a PR gesture . . . than an exchange of money (or coupons) for the release of valuable legal rights,' because the underlying 'claims had only nuisance value.'"  Id. at *6.

The district court had harsh words for the underlying claims in the cases before it:

Despite these evident problems with the proposed settlement, the limited value of the relief obtained must be considered in relation to the strength of Plaintiffs' claims in the first instance. . . .  As the Court has observed repeatedly over the course of the litigation, even assuming Plaintiffs could prove that HP's "low on ink" warnings were inaccurate or misleading, the task of determining whether the warnings actually confused consumers or resulted in the unwarranted disposal of a significant amount of ink necessarily involves a great deal of speculation.  The underprinting at issue in Rich and the expiration date at issue in Blennis involve similar challenges with respect to proof. . . .  [T]here is no reason to believe that the posture of any of the cases would improve through further litigation.

Moreover, even if the Plaintiffs could prove their claims at trial, the damages recoverable by each class member still would be very modest.  According to Plaintiffs' own analysis, only about two percent of HP inkjet printer owners replace their ink cartridges prematurely due to low on ink warnings.  Among those consumers, the amount of ink that otherwise would be used before print quality was affected appears virtually impossible to determine.

Id. at *7-*8.

The district court ultimately approved the settlement because it was negotiated at arm's length and "the value of the settlement is reasonable in light of the evident weakness of the case and the modest value of Plaintiff's claims."  Id. at *8.

But the court could not grant class counsel's unopposed fee petition.  The court estimated the total value of the injunctive relief and e-credits to the class as $1.5 million.  Thus, it reduced class counsel's fee award to $1.5 million in fees and roughly $600,000 in costs, reasoning:

[W]hile this case was extensively litigated over several years, the Court still has serious questions as to whether consumers actually incurred significant injury from HP's actions.  To allow an award of attorneys' fees to outstrip the benefit to consumers in such cases would undermine the importance of focusing the efforts of class action counsel on issues that most affect consumers.

Id. at *10.

Judge Fogel's opinion is a clear reminder that sometimes even the worst class actions should settle, but when they do, class counsel should not be rewarded with fees out of proportion to what the class receives, regardless of what they may have expended on the case.

Federal Court Rejects Nationwide Class Action Settlement

Continuing with our settlement theme, this post discusses True v. American Honda Motor Co., 2010 WL 707338 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010), in which U.S. District Judge Virginia A. Phillip ultimately rejected as unfair a class action settlement that she had preliminarily approved last August.  What changed in 6 months' time?  And can the settlement be salvaged?

Plaintiffs in True had sued Honda under California's Unfair Competition Law, the False Advertising Act, and unjust enrichment, alleging that Honda had falsely advertised the fuel economy of its Honda Civic Hybrid vehicles between 2003 and 2008 and claiming that the class had relied on these misrepresentations in paying a premium price for the vehicles.

It would appear that this is yet another one of those lawsuits that claims that the federal fuel efficiency standards that are required to be posted on new vehicles require certain kinds of driving for hybrid vehicles that some people may not understand actually promotes fuel efficiency, so that when they buy the car and drive it as they would other non-hybrid vehicles, they do not achieve the same fuel efficiency as the advertised performance using the federal standard.

After 11 months of discovery, the parties engaged in mediation and negotiated a nationwide class action settlement that the District Court preliminarily approved.  Notice went out to the class.  Ultimately, there were a number of objectors and a coalition of 25 state Attorneys General that filed oppositions to the initial proposed settlement.  The parties modified the settlement to meet many of the objections, and then moved for final approval by the District Court.

The proposed settlement did not create a settlement fund, but instead created certain categories of relief for class members.  Every class member would receive a DVD that Honda would produce that would demonstrate how to maximize the fuel efficiency of their hybrid vehicles.  Class members also could receive one of two rebates.  Option A gave a $1,000 cash rebate to those who sell their Civic Hybrid and trade it in on an eligible Honda vehicle.  Option B gave a $500 cash rebate to those who kept their Civic Hybrid and bought another eligible Honda vehicle.  In addition, a small subset of class members could receive a $100 cash payment, but only if they complained to their dealer or Honda and the dealer or Honda kept a written record of it. Finally, there was "injunctive" relief requiring Honda to change the advertising phrase "actual mileage may vary" to "actual mileage will vary."

The proposed settlement provided a full release to Honda of all claims relating to the fuel economy of the Civic Hybrid, and it allowed for incentive payments of $10,000 and $12,500 to the named plaintiffs, respectively.  Plaintiffs' counsel sought an award of $2,950,000, which Honda did not oppose.

Judge Phillip held that the class met the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements of Rule 23, but it failed the adequacy of representation requirement because the two named plaintiffs were part of the small subset of class members who would receive an actual $100 cash payment.  This presented an inherent conflict with the other class members, the court explained.  The court also held that the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met.

In assessing the fairness and adequacy of the settlement, the court challenged whether the sub-class of people who received a cash payment was fair at all.  They had no stronger or weaker legal claims than anyone else in the class.  And whether the defendants kept a record of their complaints was not in their control.  The court concluded that "the settlement here draws an arbitrary distinction among class members with identical claims and injuries, and allows some to receive a cash award, and others only a DVD and a limited rebate.  This is patently unfair, and counsels against approval of the proposed settlement."  Id. at *11.

The court also assessed the value of the rebates, noting that this is a coupon settlement that is generally disfavored.  The court analyzed whether the value of the settlement was reasonable in relation to the value of the class claims.

The court determined that the plaintiffs had reasonably strong claims.  It rejected the defendant's preemption defense, discounted the issue of whether California law could apply to a nationwide class, and then proceeded to discuss how strong the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) was for the class.  The court did acknowledge, however, that a number of class members had objected to the settlement, indicating that they were pleased with their Honda Civic Hybrids and had achieved the mileage that Honda had advertised.  Id. at *15.  Indeed, the "majority of class members who opted-out . . . cited their satisfaction with the gas mileage they were receiving from their HCHs, or otherwise opposed the merits of the suit."  Id. at *23.

The court rejected the conclusions of plaintiffs' expert, which had assigned monetary values to the rebates and the DVD.

The court also expressed great concern about class counsel's requested fee, noting that a "lodestar amount is particularly inappropriate where, as here, the benefit achieved for the class is small and the lodestar award is large."  Id. at 20.  The court also expressed concern about the procedures used to negotiate the fee:

The size of the fee request also raises concerns in light of the fact that it was negotiated at the same time as the substantive relief to the class.  "Ordinarily, 'a defendant is interested only in disposing of the total claim asserted against it . . . the allocation between the class payment and the attorneys' fees is of little or no interest to the defense.'" . . .

Here, of all of the components of the settlement, the only components with any determinative value are the attorneys' fees and incentive payments.  Under the terms of the settlement, there is no certainty that class members will receive any cash payments or rebates at all, but class counsel will receive a three million dollar payment regardless of whether one or 10,000 class members file valid claims.  Since there is no guarantee that [Honda] will pay any money out of the settlement to either class members or a cy pres beneficiary, to award three million dollars to class counsel who may have achieved no financial recovery for the class would be unconscionable.

Id. at *21 (citations omitted).

As a result of its analysis, the court concluded that the value of the settlement weighed against approval.

The decision in True demonstrates the continuing difficulty of obtaining approval of coupon settlements, even for weak claims that have little, if any, merit.

Older Entries