How Did Some Class Action Lawyers Become Humorless Prigs?

We all know about pheromones, right?  They are chemicals that one animal secretes to attract members of the opposite sex.  There's apparently a lot of research about the role of pheromones in the lives of insects. There's less research demonstrating any real role in the human species.

But pheromones are part of our popular culture.  As a nod to my friends at Abnormal Use, I'll note that many comic-book heroes have powers based on pheromones.  Stand-up comics joke about pheromones.  Part of the joke is that we all know they don't have any huge impact on men or women.  It's not like you can rub some magic elixir on your neck and instantly become an irresistable Cassanova.  Or George Clooney.  It's too bad, really.  Some of us need the help.  Which is part of what makes it fun to fantasize about such a possibility. 

Dial has capitalized on this in a humorous advertising campaign for a Men's Body Wash called "Magnetic," which it describes as "Pheromone-Infused, Attraction Enhancing Body Wash.".  Even the packaging is part of the joke.  Its instructions for use include this tongue-in-cheek fourth step:  "Stand back and watch the magic happen."  Dial promotes this product with advertising, a website, and a Facebook page, all of which uses the same wink-and-a-nod type of humor.

Of course, some lawyer had to bring a class action lawsuit about this product, claiming that its marketing creates the false perception that it's going to help consumers attract women.  But what's really surprising to me is that more than one humorless prig has filed such a suit, so now there can be a contest for control of the "litigation."  Who knows?  Perhaps someday there may even be a "Pheromone MDL"!

Ronald A. Marron of San Diego appears to be the first attorney to file suit, on February 3, 2012.  His masterpiece of a complaint is available here.  He even found a "representative" plaintiff, Mr. Robert A. Margolis, who actually was willing to plead under oath that he was "deceived by Defendants' representations about the quality and attributes of the Products, including but not limited to the purported ability of the Products to attract women because of pheromones in the Products, whereas ordinary soap does not contain pheromones."  He even pleads that he would not have bought the products if he had known that the claims about attracting women were untrue.  Mr. Margolis purports to represent a class of "[a]ll persons within the United States who purchased . . . [the Products] from the Products' release date in 2009 to the present . . ."

Apparently this suit seemed like such a brilliant idea that attorneys Craig Sean Mellon of San Diego -- along with Jeffrey M. Salas and John C. Wang of Chicago -- decided to copy it.  (Imitation is the highest form of flattery.)  They, too, filed suit in San Diego, on February 9.  Incredibly, they, too, found a "representative" plaintiff, Mr. Frank Ortega, to plead under oath that he relied on the statements about pheromones and wouldn't have bought the soap if he had known it would not attract women.  Mr. Ortega also purports to represent a nationwide class of frustrated men who bought the products from 2009 to the present.

This is the state of American class action practice, ladies and gentlemen.  Really.

How did we ever sink this low?  Well, I can tell you this much:  it's no mistake that this suit was filed in California.  California's Unfair Competition Law is often misinterpreted by its courts as removing fundamental elements of legal claims (such as reliance and causation) in the name of promoting the efficiency of class actions.  This has led to the UCL being used for purposes far, far removed from righting actual wrongs.  Instead, it's a hook that greedy attorneys use to play a game of "gotcha" with defendants.  In these suits, clients don't search for lawyers; lawyers come up with the idea for a suit and then search for clients.  They count on the fact that it will be costly enough and risky enough for a defendant to extricate itself -- even from ridiculous cases -- that the defendant will be willing to pay nuisance value to make the suit go away.  And the result often is settlements that provide next to nothing to the class, but real dollars to plaintiffs' lawyers.

I, for one, hope Dial doesn't have to spend a single dollar on this incredibly stupid, wasteful litigation.  But I know it will.  So instead I hope every dollar will be spent fighting these suits, with not a dime in tribute.

Until the law is changed, or such suits otherwise become no longer economically viable for plaintiffs' lawyers, wasteful, "gotcha" class actions like these will continue to plague our courts, crowding out suits based on real grievances.

All I Want for Christmas Is . . . [Item #5]

Okay, you're going to have to settle for giving a voucher for this product.  It presently is out of stock.  But trust me, this is one veeerrrry cool product.  Even I, Mr. Immediate Gratification, would be happy to wait past MLK Day for it -- so long as you're buying.

Lawyers like to drink.  (Lord knows sometimes we need to.)  We like to tailgate, go to the beach, and do other things where cold beverages come into play.  But we also have at least some decorum.  If someone sees a moldy old blue and white plastic cooler in MY car, just shoot me, please.

So here's the answer to classy tailgater's dilemma:  the leather ice chest. 

Yes, you heard me right.  I said LEATHER!  Who would even think to make such a thing?  Why, the good folks at Orvis, of course.  For only $995 (plus shipping), Orvis will send your most-loved lawyer -- once Orvis has made some more -- a genuine leather cooler.  It has 2,800 cubic inches of space inside, and a tres chic buckle closure outside.  The leather is hand-fitted, with stitched trim.  It would look perfect inside the trunk of your Mercedes.

Of course, like any really swank present, this one presents the recipient with a dilemma:  What drink receptacle goes with a leather ice chest? 

Watch out, Red Solo Cup!

 

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All I Want for Christmas Is . . . [List Item #4]

Litigators are creative people.  We are storytellers.  And we have to piece together a broad narrative based upon small pieces of evidence.

Creative types tend to appreciate the work of other creative types.  For example, I love art.  Paintings, photography, sculpture -- you name it.  I respect the discipline that goes into making a piece of fine art.

Here's something for your litigator's X-mas list:  the art of Gavin Zeigler.  I have collected a number of his pieces.  When I first bought one in the 1990s, his work was primarily paintings in acrylic.  But years later, he has branched out into sculpture and even furniture.

His paintings have a number of features that appeal to lawyers.  For one thing, he likes to use old stock certificates and canceled checks as media upon which to paint vibrant colors.  The details of these underlying papers peek through the paintings -- a pentimento effect.

 

He also likes to bury coins, keys and grommets under layers of color, and then use a sander to excavate them and their details.  This produces a fossil-like effect.

Zeigler also is an accomplished sculptor.  Visitors to my office encounter one of his bronzes:  "My Ex-Wife's Lawyer."

 

Zeigler's work is surprisingly affordable, and he is in a number of important public and private collections.  Interior designer Thom Felicia used Zeigler's work at the American Pavillion at the 2005 World's Exposition in Japan.

What better way to start the new year than enriching your office environment with a compelling work of fine art?

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Jury Awards Pitcher Nearly $900,000 Against Bat Maker Because He Was Hit by a Ball

A pitcher throws a fastball and gets hit in the face with a line drive ball.  Tragic?  Absolutely.  Uncommon?  Thankfully, yes.  But unanticipated?  Hardly.  Tickets to professional baseball games even carry warnings that spectators -- not just players -- must bear the risk of being hit with a baseball.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that the person standing closest to the batter (other than the catcher and the umpire, who are behind the batter) and in the batter's direct line of fire legally should be aware of a substantial risk of being hit and seriously injured by a baseball.

So should the bat manufacturer be liable for the injuries caused when a pitcher gets in the face with a ball?  To even ask the question is to answer it:  absolutely not.

So why did such a case recently go to a jury?  Law 360 recently reported that last Friday an Oklahoma federal jury awarded a pitcher $871,000 in actual damages (and gave his parents $80,095.85 in actual damages) for an aluminum bat that allegedly was defectively designed and contained insufficient warnings.  The case is styled Yeaman v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Case No. CIV-10-1097-F (W.D. Okla.).

Dillon Yeaman had been playing baseball since he was four.  On June 28, 2006, he was pitching in a high-school-age summer league game.  His catcher called for a fastball.  Dillon threw one, and the batter connected, hitting a line drive.  The ball struck Dillon in the face, fracturing bones, causing scarring, and robbing him of his sense of smell and taste.

Dillon sued the company that made the Louisville Slugger Exogrid bat that the batter had been swinging, arguing that the bat had two defects.  The design defect was, essentially, that it allowed balls to be hit at speeds that give pitchers insufficient time to react and protect themselves.  The warning defect allegedly was the failure to place a sticker on the bat stating that balls can leave the bat at speeds that can give players no opportunity to react, potentially causing serious injury or death.

The problem with this lawsuit is that it did not identify an actual defect.  The bat did precisely what it was intended to do -- allow the batter to propel the ball with power.  Notably, there was no evidence that the bat caused the ball to travel faster than a wooden bat would have done.  And plaintiffs disclaimed any notion that they were attacking the metal bat industry generally.  Yet they pointed to no specific detail of the Exogrid that allegedly caused the injury.  Indeed, according to the Defendant's summary judgment proof, the exit speed of the Exogrid had been tested by the NCAA's independent bat certification laboratory.  Not only did it meet the NCAA standard of having a ball exit speed of no greater than 97 miles per hour, but in the NCAA's 2006 testing, the Exogrid had an exit speed of 95.5 miles per hour -- lower than the acceptable limit, and in the middle of metal bats.  The Exogrid was in compliance with all requirements and specifications of the NCAA, the National Federation of High Schools, the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association, and various summer leagues, including the Pure Prairie League in which Dillon was playing.

Moreover, the law imposes no duty to warn about risks that are known or obvious.  The coach of the batter's team testified in support of summary judgment that:

The Louisville Slugger Exogrid bat was no more or less popular than any of the other bats in use in 2006 and did not stand out as a more "powerful" bat than others.

In my opinion, baseball players at the high school level understand and accept the risk that they can be hit by a thrown or batted ball.  It is my further understanding that a pitcher at the high school level, including players in the Pure Prairie League, understand and accept the risk of being hit by a batted ball, be it a line drive or otherwise.  This is a natural and inherent risk of the game of baseball.

Dillon was an experienced player who knew these risks.  He had pitched against batters using metal bats in practice and games in the junior high and high school levels.  He testified at deposition that he had hit line drives near a pitcher that the pitcher had no time to get his glove up and catch.  And twice before June 28, 2006, Dillon had been hit by balls himself.  He even admitted that he did not need to be warned that balls hit off of bats could hit him.

Although he testified that he believed the bats should have a warning that balls hit off of the bats could be unavoidable and could cause serious injury, he admitted that he as the pitcher would not see warnings written on a bat.

Ironically, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the risks of softball are so open and obvious that even a spectator in the stands assumes the risk of being hit by a ball.  Lang v. Amateur Softball Ass'n, 520 P.2d 659, 662 (Okla. 1974) ("the risk of being struck by a batted or thrown ball is one of the natural risks assumed by spectators attending a ballgame").  But the trial court in Yeaman rejected the defendant's summary judgment motion and its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.  This leads to a perverse result:  although a spectator at the June 28, 2006 game could not reach a jury under Lang because she assumed the risk as a matter of law, the player most obviously at risk of being hit by a ball not only could reach a jury, but receive a verdict.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that a court has allowed a suit to proceed against the maker of a metal bat despite the obvious assumption of the risk.  I previously have posted about a similar jury verdict, which was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court this year.  Refusing to give effect to the obvious assumption of risk and the legal principle that one has no duty to warn of risks that are known or obvious risks making bat manufacturers no-fault insurers of their products, liable for all injuries that occur during the use of their products regardless of legal principles.

All I Want for Christmas Is . . . [List Item #3]

Lawyers need watches.  Appointments, hearings, recording time spent on matters.  Watches are an essential tool of the business.

Some watches are better for certain purposes than others.  I learned that the hard way last week.  I was speaking on a panel at ACI's Drug and Medical Device Conference.  We had more material than we could cover in our panel, and we had assigned time limits to each topic.  Time was at a premium.

And so I slipped off my watch to lay it on the table in front of me.  Big mistake.  I was wearing a diver's watch with a chunky metal case and a rubber band.  Form fitting.  It wouldn't flatten out.  And it wouldn't sit upright like a clock.  Too heavy.  I had to lay this massive mistake on its side.

I needed a good basic watch.  Simple.  Something that would lay flat.

Something like the new Mougin & Piquard Grande Seconde watch at J. Crew.  It has the classic Swiss design of a pilot's watch from the 1930s, steel casing, and a leather band (in black or tan).  It was produced in conjunction with high-end watch retailer Tourneau, and is based on designs that had been archived for decades.

And at $425, it won't break the bank. 

Stylish.  Simple.  Functional.  Affordable.

Santa, put it on my list.  Or better yet, in my stocking!

 

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All I Want for Christmas Is . . . [List Item #2]

In case you missed it, I'm running a series in December about items lawyers can put on their Christmas Lists that they might actually want to receive.

Item Number 2 for your list:  The Cognita Bench.  If you're like me, you do far too much work at home, rather than in the office.  Maybe you live in a part of the world where you can have a big house and you have a spacious home office with lots of shelves and drawers.  Maybe even a humidor.  Smug fancypants.

I don't.  I live in Manhattan, in a 45th-floor apartment where space is at a premium.  My "home office" is a 10' x 14' space that doubles as the "guest bedroom" (and Mr. Ted E. Bear's favorite perch for watching traffic).  I needed some place to store files, cases I put on this blog, paper for the printer, spare cords for all of my electronic devices, and office supplies from The Office Despot (er, Depot).  And I needed some seating.  And a table on which to put things.

Meet the Cognita Bench:

It's quality material (walnut) and sturdy.  Handsome, too, I think.  The cushion comes in brown, red, or green.  It makes a great bench with a side "table" for drinks.  But it also is literally bursting with storage space:

Space for a file drawer's worth of hanging files under the seat.  A deep drawer and shallow drawer.  Even a personal organizer under the "table" portion for pens, stationery, and clips. 

It's made by those creative folks at Blu Dot for Herman Miller.  And Design Within Reach even has it on a 15% off sale through December 12.

This is the cool type of gift that will make you want to get organized.  Put one on your list.

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An Important Message from Mr. Ted E. Bear

 

Dear Readers,

Most of you know that I am a products liability scholar and a HUGE fan of this blog.  What you may not know is that the ABA Journal has named this blog to its Blawg 100 for 2011.  As part of this honor, it has placed this blog in competition with four other blogs to be named the best blog in the torts category. 

Unfortunately, Russell takes such competitions very seriously.  In fact, when the folks at Abnormal Use won the category last year and claimed their prize -- a new convertible -- he wouldn't leave the apartment for over a month.  (Just imagine what that did to me.  I don't have opposable thumbs and can't open the door to walk myself!) 

So this year, to avoid that result, I have appointed myself this blog's campaign manager and have made it my mission to get out the vote.  Voting is so easy, even a cat could do it!  Go to the ABA Journal's site.  Register your e-mail address (it's free).  And then click on the torts category and vote.

So please, take the 60 seconds or so it takes to vote.  It would mean a lot to me, too.  Russell has promised me extra chicken treats and the shotgun seat in the new convertible if this blog wins.

Gratefully,

Mr. Ted E. Bear

 

 

 

Yours Truly To Participate in a Panel on Blogging

For those of you in the New York area who might be looking for some CLE credit, consider attending the Fall Conference of the Asian American Bar Association of New York on Saturday, September 17 in Skadden's offices at 4 Times Square.  The conference runs all day and has four 1- hour 45-minute sessions, each of which is comprised of four concurrent panel discussions.  The range of topics is impressive, from family law, intellectual property law, and mortgage/real estate fraud to promoting diversity on the bench and developing skills as in-house counsel.  Each of the panels is sponsored by an AABANY committee, and I am appearing on the panel discussing legal blogging, which is sponsored by the Student Outreach Committee and the Young Lawyers Committee.  Fellow panelists will include bloggers Vivia Chen, James Daily, Scott Greenfield, and Dominic Mauro.  We will be sharing what inspired us to create our blogs, how hosting a blog impacts us, and how blogging generally can be expected to impact the practice of law.  I hope to see you there. 

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JPML: One of These Things Is Not Like the Other

Every so often, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issues an opinion that leaves me scratching my head and saying "huh?".  The JPML issued one such opinion just a few weeks ago.  I thought it might be interesting to compare and contrast this opinion with another JPML opinion from the same hearing date.  Let's start with the typical one.

In In re:  Dial Complete Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, MDL No. 2263, Transfer Order (J.P.M.L. Aug. 18, 2011), the court was faced with a series of ten putative class actions pending in seven judicial districts.  (All assert statewide classes, and two also purport to represent nationwide classes.)  As is demonstrated by an exemplar complaint, the cases assert that Dial Complete Soap is deceptively marketed as capable of killing 99.9% of bacteria without having adequate scientific research to back the claim, and without disclosing that many bacteria have become resistant to the active ingredient in the soap.

The JPML decided to consolidate the cases in a new MDL to be venued in New Hampshire, holding that "these ten actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization under Section 1407 . . . will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation."  Transfer Order at 1.

Compare the Dial decision with In re:  Nutella Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, MDL No. 2248, Order Denying Transfer (J.P.M.L. Aug. 16, 2011).  In Nutella, the panel was faced with three putative national class actions in two judicial districts.  The cases assert that Nutella hazelnut spread is deceptively marketed as a nutritious part of a healthy breakfast without adequately disclosing that the spread is made from saturated fats and large amounts of processed sugar, allegedly leading to heart disease, obesity, and diabetes.  All of the plaintiffs and the defendant supported consolidation, although they disagreed on where the MDL should be located.

The JPML denied the motion, stating:

Here, the Panel is not persuaded that Section 1407 centralization is necessary for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or for the just and efficient conduct of this litigation at this time.

The actions may share some factual questions regarding the common defendant's marketing practices, but these questions do not appear complicated.  Indeed, the parties have not convinced us that any common factual questions are sufficiently complex or numerous to justify Section 1407 transfer at this time.  Cooperation among the parties and deference among the courts should minimize the possibility of duplicative discovery and inconsistent pretrial rulings.

Order Denying Transfer at 1.

Huh?

So what is so different about Nutella?  Obviously, it involves 7 fewer actions; but the JPML has created MDLs for 3 nationwide putative class actions before.  There were 12 plaintiffs' firms involved in Dial, but only 2 in Nutella, but surely that was not the sole reason for denying the MDL transfer that all parties requested.

I suspect that a large part of the JPML's motivation in denying an MDL transfer is the obviously frivolous nature of the Nutella lawsuits.  Nutella, as a food product, lists its ingredients right on the label, and includes "Nutrition Facts" that disclose the calories and amounts of saturated and trans fats contained in a serving of the product.  You don't need to conduct discovery or create an MDL to know that a claim based on the failure to disclose facts that are right on the label of the product shouldn't survive a motion to dismiss -- regardless of whether New Jersey or California law applies.

Now that the cases will go back to federal courts in New Jersey and California, it will be interesting to monitor the Nutella cases to see how they fare in pleadings challenges.

Having a Candid Conversation with Business Leaders about Class Actions

Have you ever wished that you could pull aside the people running a company and explain to them the seriousness of the threat of class actions?  My former colleague and current Greenberg Traurig partner Rob Herrington has done just that in his new book, Verdict for the Defense:  Fighting Jackpot Justice with Firewall Defense Strategies.  Although Rob's book has lots of good ideas that we as lawyers can benefit from, it is a candid and easily readable primer for business leaders on the scope of the risk posed by class actions and the simple steps such leaders can take to make it less likely that a class will be certified against their companies.

I asked Rob a few questions about Verdict for the Defense, which is available from Amazon or directly from the website link above.  His responses follow. 

 

1.  What made you target your class action book at businesspeople, rather than lawyers?

 

Because business leaders can and should play a central role in working to prevent and defend this type of litigation.  Class actions and mass actions create massive risk and massive expense that can threaten the financial stability of even the strongest companies.  Seemingly small or insignificant disputes can metastasize into a massive class action if not handled properly.  Business people need to understand this threat and often are in the best position to ensure that the company takes proactive steps to limit this risk.  Too often, however, business leaders are brought into the discussion too late - after a class has been certified or just before a key deposition.   At that point, it usually is too late; executives face a Hobson's choice of paying millions to settle what often seem like dubious cases or risking trial, where exposure may be in hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. By learning about the risks created by class actions and mass actions, my hope is that executives begin to take a more active role in identifying areas where the company may be at risk and implementing strategies to limit that risk.  


2.  In your book, you give some strategies for avoiding class actions.  Tell my readers a bit about them, and where you came up with them.

 

The book's purpose is to offer ideas and strategies that business leaders can use to begin a discussion within their own companies about identifying and limiting the risk of class actions and mass actions.  The book discusses a number of strategies, which include implementing strategic variability to limit class action risk, improving customer service and complaint management as a means to reducing class action risk, and monitoring customer complaint websites, social media, and litigation against competitors to identify and understand emerging risks.  These strategies came from a number of sources. Some of it comes from personal experience, but most came from interviews and research.  In writing the book, I interviewed several plaintiffs' class action specialists and grilled them on what they look for in identifying and filing new class action and mass action cases.  Those interviews led to a number of strategies for reducing class actions.  During the research phase, I also studied all of the major class action decisions during the past decade, trying to identify trends and factors that led to a successful outcome (i.e., prevailing on a motion to dismiss or defeating class certification).  The book tries to meld this research with risk management principles to give business executives an overall framework and process for identifying these risks and working to limit them. 


3.  A lot of people predicted that consumer class actions would be dead after the Supremes' recent decision upholding arbitration clauses and class action waivers in consumer contracts.  I was skeptical of that viewpoint.  What's your view on the subject?

 

Consumer class actions are alive and well and present just as great a risk as ever.  Having spent more than a decade litigating these types of cases, I am constantly amazed by the ingenuity and tenacity of the plaintiffs' class action bar.   They will continue to present challenges to arbitration clauses and class action waivers in consumer agreements on any number of grounds. Public Justice, for example, has published an article offering 12 arguments plaintiffs' lawyers can use to challenge these provisions.  It also will be interesting to watch whether plaintiffs' class action lawyers start trying to use collateral estoppel principles to expand the impact of individual arbitration awards, if successful.  Now is not the time for companies to let down their guard.  These recent Supreme Court decisions have created an opportunity for companies to take a hard look at their business processes and start to implement methods to reduce the risk of these cases being filed.  

 

4.  What is the single legal reform that would have the most positive impact on the defense of class actions going forward?

Not fair limiting it to just one.  Let me offer a few ideas.  First, impose a discovery stay and a heightened pleading standard for putative class actions, similar to the reforms instituted through the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).  In too many cases, plaintiffs' lawyers use discovery, particularly the enormous costs of e-discovery, to put pressure on defendants to settle.  There is no reason to permit plaintiffs to wield that type of weapon until the court is satisfied that the complaint states a cause of action based on facts, rather than speculation and innuendo.  Second, permit an immediate appeal of orders granting class certification (rather than just those denying) and permit more robust review by appellate courts.  An order certifying a class action is a game changer, creating massive exposure and massive risk for any company.  It is too important to leave to the discretion of a single judge.  Finally, implement a system that requires plaintiffs to pay for discovery costs up and until the point where they can establish, through evidence, a prima facie case of liability.  Discovery costs in class actions and mass action are asymmetrical, with a far greater portion of the costs falling on defendants because the defendant typically has far more information and documents.  Plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes use that asymmetry to increase the costs of litigation exponentially in the hope of creating settlement pressure - pressure that has nothing to do with the merits of the case.  Removing that tactic would make the process more fair, straightforward and efficient.   

 

5.  What's the one thing that companies faced with class action lawsuits most often fail to do that would improve their chance of prevailing if they would do it?

 

That's hard because there is no magic bullet to defeating these cases.  The "trick," if there is one, is understanding the risks these cases present, including how and why they are filed, and then establishing defensive measures designed to reduce risk and maximize effective defense arguments.  But if you're looking for just one simple strategy, consider this:  when a consumer class action is filed, one of the first things the company will be asked to provide is the advertising/disclosures/packaging/contracts/webpages that the named plaintiff viewed.   Many times these materials are subject to judicial notice in connection with a motion to dismiss and can provide the basis for a solid Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, which could end the case before it gets started.  The next thing the company will be asked for are all versions of the various advertising/disclosures/packaging/contracts/webpages for the product or service that is at issue in the case.  The hope is that there are a number of different versions with (hopefully) material differences that can be used to defeat class certification.  I am consistently surprised how often companies are unable to provide this information, often because of lax or nonexistent record-keeping practices.  When that happens, the company can lose one of the most effective weapons in defeating class actions, leaving it to proceed with expensive discovery and increasing the chances of a certified class.  If a company wants to improve its ability to defend consumer class actions, it should take a hard look at its record keeping and ensure that it can readily provide the documents and information needed to effectively defend these cases.  

 

 

Drinks in Toronto?

I'm going to be in Toronto Thursday and Friday of this week for the ABA Annual Convention.  (I'm part of a TIPS panel on recent developments in class actions at 3:45 on Friday afternoon comprised of Prof. Sam Issacharoff, Elizabeth Cabraser, and the Honorable Barbara Greer.)

I'd welcome the opportunity to share a drink with readers of this blog.  Drop me a line if you'll be in Toronto, too, and want to meet up.

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"Public Trust" Global Warming Suit Gets Tossed By Montana Supremes

Last month I reported on a group of environmental activists who filed a bushel of global warming lawsuits around the nation asserting that state governments had a duty under a so-called "public trust doctrine" to hold the atmosphere in trust for the children, and thus should implement strict caps on greenhouse gas emissions.

Apparently one of those complaints was filed in the Montana Supreme Court asserting the original jurisdiction of that court.  The Montana Supreme Court ain't buying it.  Last week the court threw out the petition, observing that its original jurisdiction is reserved for very limited circumstances that involve purely legal questions of statutory and constitutional construction, and urgency and emergency factors make the normal appeal process inadequate.  See Barhaugh v. Montana, No. OP 11-0258, Slip op. (Mont. Jun. 15, 2011).  That was not the case here.  The complaint presented a lot of factual questions, such as whether the Legislature has been prevented from taking action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and Montana's role in creating climate change.

As the court concluded:

We conclude this case does not involve purely legal questions.  This Court is ill-equipped to resolve the factual assertions presented by Petitioners.  We further conclude that Petitioners have not established urgency or emergency factors that would preclude litigation in a trial court followed by the normal appeal process.  Petitioners have failed to establish how emergent factors exist in Montana that require this Court's immediate attention in light of the lack of original jurisdiction in the other forty-nine states.

Slip op. at 2.

One down, scores more to go . . .

So far, this activist's group's nationwide "Atmospheric Trust Litigation" is a bigger flop than Mr. Popper's Penguins.

Note to Activists: Bring Back the Polar Bears, Please

I am traveling on the Left Coast for business this week.  And so it was with a certain amount of bemusement that I read this article that came across my Blackberry yesterday.  It explains that an environmental activist group, "Our Children's Trust," has decided to sue a number of states, seeking to force judges into ordering state governments to mandate the reduction of greenhouse gases, with the goal of preventing global warming. 

One of the activists is quoted as saying:

"We should be getting youths in front of the courts, not polar bears," Wood said, referring to a widely publicized attempt to have courts declare polar bears endangered as rising temperatures melt Arctic ice.

So how are these activists using America's youth to paint a compelling picture for judicial regulation of greenhouse gases?  Read this portion of a complaint apparently filed by the organization in New Mexico:

Climate change is adversely affecting [16-year-old] Akilah Sanders-Reed now.  Akilah is a skiing enthusiast and has been skiing regularly for the last 8 years.  Over that time, Akilah has seen a decrease in the snowpack on the slopes of Taos and Santa Fe.  The snowpack on those slopes has been thin and generally not good for skiing.  Akilah plans to continue skiing and to teach her younger brother to ski.  Therefore she is concerned that if the quality and amount of snowpack on the Taos and Santa Fe ski slopes continues to decline, she will have fewer opportunities to ski during the already abbreviated ski season in New Mexico.

Compl. para. 10.

Really?!!!  This is the tragedy that justifies judicial exercise of Executive Branch powers?  No skiing on Spring Break?  Bring back the cute, cuddly Polar Bears whose very existence is threatened, please!

The group's legal strategy seems as flawed as its storytelling.  It is suing the governors of various states on the so-called "public trust doctrine," which they describe as a common law theory.  But it's hardly a cause of action, like public nuisance.  Rather, it is simply a doctrine recognizing the sovereign's ownership interest in the land underlying navigable waters.  Ironically, the whole reason for the doctrine is to preserve the ability of the public to use such waters for commerce.  Our Children's Trust, of course, wants to invoke the doctrine to impede commerce and economic activity, state by state.

The fact that it can't cite in its New Mexico complaint a single New Mexico case applying the doctrine as they request gives you some idea of just what a long-shot their legal theory actually is.  They do nothing in their pleadings to anticipate the defenses that typically have proven fatal to climate change cases.  For example, they do nothing to establish the children's standing to assert a claim.  In public nuisance -- which is an actual cause of action designed to protect interference with the public's right of enjoyment of property -- the right to sue is reserved to the sovereign unless an individual can prove that he or she suffers a special injury that is different in type and degree from that suffered by the general public.  Notably, a bad ski day (if there really is such a thing) wouldn't cut it.

Similarly, defendants have argued that federal statutes and regulations preempt individual common law claims aimed at regulating greenhouse gas emissions.  Notably, even the cases that Our Children's Trust cite in its complaint expressly recognize the preeminence of federal authority.  For example, in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the court observed that the state's rights and obligations under the public trust doctrine were "subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control [the] navigation [of the state's navigable waters] so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States."  Id. at 435.  Likewise, in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) -- also cited by plaintiffs -- the court cautioned that:

The State's power over the beds of navigable waters remains subject to only one limitation:  the paramount power of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign commerce. 

Id. at 551.

Moreover, the plaintiffs make no allowance in their pleading for defenses such as the political question doctrine, primary jurisdiction, or causation.  Notably, courts and advocates that have considered the climate change question have acknowledged that the issue of greenhouse gas emissions is a global one; emissions from one part of the globe may travel and have effects in other parts of the globe.  Thus, localized emissions caps -- like plaintiffs advocate -- have no real hope of abating the alleged nuisance locally, and local emissions cannot be deemed the substantial cause of alleged local climate change.

Ultimately, all that Our Children's Trust has achieved is making cash-strapped states that have no ability to solve the problem defendants in frivolous litigation that will cost lots of time and money to defend.  And they did so without finding a more compelling mascot than fluffy polar bears.

Some Thoughts on Matrixx Initiatives

I'm no securities lawyer.  Thankfully, I have colleagues who find the securities laws fascinating, and they -- not I -- handle the securities cases.

That said, there are times when securities decisions can impact us in the Mass Torts community.  Yesterday's unanimous opinion from the U.S. Supremes (Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. ___ (2011)) is such a decision.

Plenty of other bloggers have laid out the basics of the opinion, so I will not dwell on it here.  Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court rejected an Over-the-Counter ("OTC") cold medicine manufacturer's argument that the failure to disclose to investors some adverse event reports that did not rise to the level of statistical significance was per se not a violation of the securities laws.

Most commentators suggest that Matrixx Initiatives likely will make it more difficult for defendants to win motions to dismiss securities laws claims.  That may be right, at least on the margins.  But from my perspective, the sky is not falling, and plaintiffs still bear a considerable burden to show that the disclosure of the omitted information would be viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available by the company.  What follows are some random thoughts that occurred to me upon reading Matrixx Initiatives:

1.  This is NOT a holding that manufacturers must disclose every adverse event report or lawsuit to investors.  Rather, a company must do so only if it alters the “total mix of information available” using the reasonable investor standard.  Slip op. at 9-10 (citing Basic).  The Court reiterated its concern about adopting a rule that would “‘bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.’”  Slip op. at 10 (citation omitted).  It recognized that adverse event reports are common, and that they do not, standing alone, “mean that the drug caused the event.”   Slip op. at 15.  The real question is “whether a reasonable investor would have viewed the nondisclosed information ‘“as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”’”  Slip op. at 15 (quoting Basic; emphasis in original).

2.  To determine whether adverse event reports or other information are material, one must examine what the manufacturer actually said.  The Court stressed that the securities laws do not “create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information.”  Rather, such disclosures are only necessary where the failure to make them would make statements the company actually made misleading.  Thus, “[e]ven with respect to information that a reasonable investor might consider material, companies can control what they have to disclose under these provisions by controlling what they say to the market.”  Slip op. at 16.  Here, the defendant publicly discussed a product that accounted for 70% of its sales.  It predicted revenues were going to rise by 50 – and then 80 – percent.  The defendant also said the safety and efficacy of zinc in treating cold symptoms was well established and described the reports of anosmia as “completely unfounded and misleading,” even though it had conducted no studies of its own and allegedly knew the available scientific evidence was “‘insufficient’” to determine general causation. The Supreme Court effectively held that these affirmative statements could have made otherwise irrelevant adverse event reports and lawsuits the type of material information that investors would find necessary to alter the “total mix” of information.

3.  Just because the Supreme Court refused to make Daubert the bright-line materiality test, it didn’t throw science out the window in making the materiality determination.  The Court recognized the extremely limited value of an adverse event report.  And it noted that FDA considers a variety of information in evaluating safety risks:

Factors such as “strength of the association,” “temporal relationship of the product use and the event,” “consistency of findings across available data sources,” evidence of a dose-response for the effect,” “biologic plausibility,” “seriousness of the event relative to the disease being treated,” “potential to mitigate risk in the population,” “feasibility of further study using observational or controlled clinical study designs,” and “degree of benefit the product provides, including availability of other therapies.”

Slip op. at 13 (citation omitted).  The Court then hypothesized that a reasonable investor could consider the same types of factors:

As a result, assessing the materiality of adverse event reports is a “fact-specific” inquiry, Basic, 485 U.S. at 236, that requires consideration of the source, content, and context of the reports.  This is not to say that statistical significance (or lack thereof) is irrelevant—only that it is not dispositive of every case.

Slip op. at 15.

One can imagine that the result in Matrixx Initiatives might have been very different indeed if, for example:  (1) the manufacturer had a pile of studies establishing the safety and efficacy of the product (like those necessary to obtain regulatory approval of a prescription product), or (2) there were published case-controlled studies finding no link between anosmia and zinc, or (3) an FDA advisory committee had investigated and rejected the claim that zinc causes anosmia.

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In sum, Matrixx Initiatives seems like the perfect storm of a case, where the manufacturer had a lot to say about a product that represented most of its revenues, while having precious little science in its pocket to back up its very verbal defense of the product.  That the Supreme Court said some isolated adverse event reports could possibly rise to a level of materiality in that unusual scenario is a far cry from saying such information is generally material or should presumptively be disclosed.  In fact, the Matrixx Initiatives Court was very careful to make it clear that it was NOT reaching such a conclusion.  As such, the decision may well become one that -- over time -- is effectively limited to its somewhat unusual fact pattern.

File under "I Told You So": Oklahoma Court Affirms Dismissal of Claim Against Mobile Phone Providers for Failure to Warn of the Dangers of Distracted Driving

Matt Richtel over at the New York Times has a real interest in the subject of auto accidents associated with driving while talking on or texting with a mobile phone, having written a whole series of articles called Driven to Distraction.  A little over a year ago, he wrote an article about a case in Oklahoma where a woman's estate sued Sprint/Nextel (the wireless provider) and Samsung (the phone manufacturer) for a death caused by their customer, who ran a red light while talking on his mobile phone.  The theory of liability was that the defendants' failure to warn the distracted driver of the dangers of driving while using his mobile phone caused the accident and the decedent's death. 

The article quoted a law professor talking about how compelling the claim was.  I, however, was included in the article, throwing cold water on the claim based on the common knowledge defense.  Subsequently, I wrote a blog post detailing more defense arguments, starting with the absence of a duty.  And I quoted the excellent decision on duty in this context, Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. App. 2004).

Well guess what?  The Oklahoma trial court ultimately granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Oklahoma lawsuit.  It was then sent by expedited appeal -- with no new briefing -- to the intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the decision on December 9, 2010.  See Estate of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., Case No. 108,648, Slip op. (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. Dec. 9, 2010).  On February 23, 2011, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided not to hear the appeal and directed that judgment should be entered consistent with the lower court's decision.

The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the wireless provider and the mobile phone manufacturer owed no legal duty to the plaintiff's decedent.  She was not their customer; they had no legal or contractual relationship.  Slip op. at 4.  The court relied heavily on Williams and the policy arguments made therein, including that court's conclusion that it was not legally foreseeable that the sale of a cell phone would result in a fatal automobile accident.  Id. at 7.  Moreover, the public policy against making mobile phone providers insurers against driver inattention "'would effectively require the companies to stop selling cellular phones entirely because the companies have no way of preventing customers from using the phones while driving.'" 

It bears noting that the court's analysis was solely of a negligence cause of action, because that is what plaintiff asserted.  But as the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability recognizes, there is no real difference between strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn. 

The court also discussed the complete lack of causation -- which is the flip side of the foreseeability argument -- in light of the duties imposed on drivers by Oklahoma law to "devote [their] full time and attention" to driving, "use ordinary care to prevent injury," and "exercise ordinary care in keeping a lookout consistent with the safety of other vehicles."  Slip op. at 10.  Ultimately, however, the court refused to reach the causation question because it was unnecessary in light of the court's holding no duty existed as a matter of law. 

The Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Doyle is a strong demonstration that trying to use civil legal duties to make the US a Nanny State is simply wrongheaded.  Legal duty does not extend as far as foreseeability, and where statutes impose duties on drivers to avoid inattentive driving, product sellers are entitled to expect the driver to fulfill his legal obligations.  There would be no principled end to imposing a legal duty on mobile phone companies to prevent others' inattentive driving:  McDonald's would be vulnerable for their drive-in windows, cosmetics companies for their portable make-up, and Victor Kiam -- God rest his soul -- for battery-charged razors.  Public policy weighs against such onerous rules.  Legal responsibility for inattentive driving rests with the inattentive driver, which is as it should be.

Four Loko Suit Is an Example of Bogus Economic Loss Classes

Yesterday Law360 reported that the maker of Four Loko -- a flavored malt beverage -- was sued in a putative nationwide class action.  A quick review of the complaint reveals the dubiousness of the plaintiff's claims and, more importantly, demonstrates the sheer avarice underlying these sorts of "economic loss" class actions in the product liability context generally.

People have consumed alcohol and caffeine together for so long that their effects are common knowledge.  Whether it's an Irish Coffee, a Rum & Coke, an Expresso Martini, or a popular "energy drink" and vodka, caffeinated alcohol drinks are far from uncommon.  The distilled spirits used in mixing such cocktails often have more than 25 percent alcohol by volume.  The defendant's Four Loko, according to the complaint, had between 6 and 12 percent alcohol by volume, depending on the state in which it was sold.

As the complaint reflects, over the last five years some in the public health community have voiced concerns about combining alcohol with caffeine.  Certain studies mentioned in the complaint reported that young adults who made cocktails of vodka and a popular caffeinated "energy drink" did not perceive some of the effects of intoxication (e.g., drowsiness, impaired motor skills).  The complaint paints a gruesome picture, attempting to blame Four Loko (rather than other beverages) for incidents of alcohol poisoning and deaths.  Compl. para. 27.

But the complaint doesn't seek to compensate anyone who allegedly was physically injured by the product (although it doesn't exclude them from the class and presumably would bar their future claims through res judicata).  And -- although it prays for a "corrective advertising campaign" -- it doesn't seek to stop the sale of product.  That's because the defendant beat them to it:  the manufacturer itself reformulated the product last year to address the concerns raised by the Food and Drug Administration, voluntarily removing the caffeine, taurine, and guarana from its product.

Instead, the plaintiff in this case is a woman who allegedly bought Four Loko Fruit Punch on two consecutive days last August "for a purchase price of approximately $3 per can" without "any warning of the particular dangers of drinking a caffeinated beverage with high alcoholic content."  Id. at para. 30.  She alleges that she and the class of all Four Loko customers across the nation "spent money purchasing Four Loko at a price premium when it actually had significantly less value than was reflected in the price [they] paid for it."  Id. at para. 32.

The Bottom line:  The class wants to be refunded part of the money they spent buying and drinking 23.5 ounce cans of "Four Loko" which clearly listed the ingredients caffeine, taurine and guarana, and (according to the plaintiff) was commonly referred to on the street as "blackout in a can."  Id.at 19.  And what could be the reason for this refund?  The can didn't disclose the alleged "dangers of drinking a caffeinated beverage with high alcoholic content."  Really?!

Like so many "economic loss" class actions, this is a lawsuit invented by lawyers to use the tool of aggregation to enrich themselves on the fiction that consumers actually suffered small injuries that make this a "negative value suit" susceptible to class treatment.  Horsepuckey!  Particularly in this case.  No honest economist will be able to testify that a product purportedly referred to as "blackout in a can" had an inflated price because it failed to disclose risks.  Period.

But beyond that, let's look at some of the other obstacles to certifying this class.  To begin with, plaintiffs likely will not be able to build an economic model to support their price theory for much the same reasons that Judge Denise Cote listed in her opinion rejecting the "inflated price" theory in Weiner v. Snapple.  Notably, the defendant here is in an even better position to say that it did not control retail pricing, since it is far removed from retail sales due to the "three-tier system" that keeps manufacturers from controlling wholesalers, who are similarly prevented from controlling retailers (both on-premise retailers and off-premise retailers).

Second, the class definition fails to exclude the (presumably vast majority of) class members who got exactly what they paid for and would make the same purchase again if the defendant had not voluntarily reformulated the product.  This is a fundamental -- and likely irreparable -- failure of pleading.  The fountain versus bottled Diet Coke cases are probably the best example of this strong defense argument.  See State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Mo. 2008); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006).

Next, look at the causes of action pled.  Three out of four of them are California statutes:  the Unfair Competition Law, the False Advertising Law, and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (which doesn't even plead that the defendant has received and had a chance to respond to a proper notice letter).  There is absolutely no basis for imposing California law on transactions that occurred in other states; the defendant is not even a California resident.  And when was the last time you saw a nationwide class certified on the consumer protection statutes of the various states?  Moreover, California case law in the last few years suggests that there is a causation requirement inherent in a restitution claim, and individual class members who were not deceived are not entitled to receive a partial refund on products they consumed and enjoyed.

The fourth and final cause of action -- "fraudulent concealment" -- is typically a means to do an end run around the statute of limitations.  To the extent this cause of action is intended as a basis for recovery, it is "fraud."  Fraud law varies considerably by state, and certainly requires individualized proof of reliance.  There can be no class action on this count.

The whole issue of caffeinated alcohol beverages has, in my personal opinion, been horribly bungled by public health advocates and regulators who assail certain companies apparently to score media points while not insisting that everyone (brewers, distillers, makers of popular mixers, and bartenders who mix cocktails) play by the same rules.  (I suppose I benefit from this selective "enforcement," as I enjoy drinking a particular unnamed double-expresso vodka on the rocks on rainy Fall football afternoons.  And no one has gone after it -- yet.  But I keep an extra case in my basement, on the off chance that consistency becomes a hobgoblin in some official's mind.)

Regulatory inconsistencies aside, make no mistake:  this lawsuit, which was brought against a company that already voluntarily discontinued the sale of caffeinated alcohol beverages, has nothing whatsoever to do with public health.  And it has nothing to do with compensating people who were surprised about the product they bought.  This lawsuit is about the lawyers' fees, pure and simple.  The thing that encourages me is that if the defendant sticks to its guns and makes the right arguments, this suit should be a dry hole for the lawyers who are speculating on it.

Retailers Sing the Blues: Song-Beverly Act Cases Explode in the Wake of Pineda

File this under "Predictable."  Ever since the California Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Song-Beverly Act to ask for a customer's zip code because it is purportedly "personal identifying information," there has been a flood of filings of similar suits against retailers in California.  Duh.

One blog reports lawsuits having been filed against Target, Old Navy, Macy's, and Cost Plus.  And just today, a press release came over my transom from a lawyer who barely has a website about his new suit against the oil and gas industry:

Today's lawsuit . . . alleges that Chevron, Conocophillips (Conoco, Phillips 66, and Union 76), Exxonmobil (Exxon, Mobil), Shell, Tesoro (USA Gasoline) and Thrifty gasoline stations, both corporate owned and franchised, violated the Song-Beverly Act by requiring customers to type in their zip code then recording that information electronically and sending it to a credit card processing site.

The Song-Beverly Act provides for civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each repeat violation.  The defendant oil companies may be liable for up to a billion dollars a day, making this one of the largest consumer class actions in history.

It's definitely one of the most worthless to consumers.  I mean really.  How many Jacksons can there be in zip code 10036?  Have I really lost any personal identifying information by the disclosure of that fact?  Is my state of residence personal identifying information under the Act, too?

How long is it going to take the elected officials of California to stop the flood of ridiculous lawsuits caused by the California Supremes' recent Pineda decision?  And how much will California's business community lose defending against these cases in the meantime?

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A Players' Class Action Against the NFL for Concussions?

John Culhane over at Slate has a very interesting post asserting that two class actions are being prepared against the National Football League on behalf of players with brain injuries.  The theory underlying the putative suits, he reports, is that the NFL did not do enough to warn players of the neurological problems that can result from repeated blows to the head.

Culhane analyzes a number of the legal theories and defenses, although he does not question how such a personal injury class could ever be certified as a class action.  Of course, it couldn't, since individual issues of causation and liability obviously would flunk the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

Still, the post -- and the idea behind it -- raises some fascinating issues for cocktail conversation as we approach the Super Bowl.  Feel free to share your own views of the strongest legal theories or defenses in the comments section below.

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What I Did on My Winter Vacation

So it has been a few weeks since my last post.  I took some time off -- some voluntary (vacation), some not (the flu).

Here's my report on what I did on my Winter Vacation:

CHRISTMAS WITH THE FOLKS IN DESTIN, FLORIDA

Ate lots of seafood. 

X-mas presents:  Hartmann briefcase, custom trapper's hat made of silver fox.

 

NEW YEAR'S IN PARIS!

Degustation Dinner at L'Atelier de Joel Robuchon Etoile

Caviar, Langoustine, Saint-Jacques, Black Cod, Suckling Lamb and truffles, truffles, truffles!

Joel Robuchon was there and signed my menu.

Musee Nissim de Camondo

Musee Jacquemart Andre

Musee Rodin

Le Pantheon

Dinner at Bernard Loiseau's Tante Marguerite

Dinner at Alain Ducasse's Jules Verne in the Eiffel Tower

Drinks at Costes

Laughs at Michou

Shopping

 

THE FLU IN NEW YORK

Dinner of Campbell's

Dinner of Ollie's Wonton Soup

Tour of CVS

Tissues, tissues, tissues!

 

Now you're caught up on what I've been doing the past few weeks.  And I'll work hard to catch you up on the important developments of 2011.  Here's to a happy, healthy and prosperous new year for all of you!

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Mr. Ted E. Bear Gets Out the Vote

 

Awww, can't you let me sleep?!!  I've been working like a dawg here, promoting this blog for the Blawg 100 Torts competition, which runs through December 30.  You can't believe how many people find it too onerous to register to vote.  All you've gotta do is plug in your e-mail and a password that you make up, and then wait for the ABA Journal to send you a confirmatory link.  Click on that link and -- voila! -- you can vote for this blog!  Unless, that is, you're even lazier than me.

I'm going to grab a little more shut-eye, but for those of you who missed out on my last set of voting instructions, here they are again:

First, you must register to vote.  Don't worry.  They only want your e-mail address and for you to set a username and password.  No phone number.  No firstborn child.  No Nigerian bank account numbers.

And you don't have to be an ABA member or pay dues!  This is representation WITHOUT taxation, if you will.  (And how often can you say that of the ABA?)

Once you've registered, they'll send a link to your e-mail that you must click on to activate.  Then go to the Blawg 100 and select Torts out of the horizontal list of twelve categories (in brown).  Scroll down to view the nominees, and click "vote" next to your favorite blog. 

 

 

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LOCAL CELEBRITY MR. TED E. BEAR ENDORSES THIS BLOG IN BLAWG 100 COMPETITION

 

"When I'm not busy reading Owen on Products Liability, eating kibble, or sniffing the latest bit of tail to walk down my block, I read Jackson on Consumer Class Actions and Mass Torts," explains Mr. Ted E. Bear, local celebrity and the Top Dog in Hell's Kitchen.  "It has all of the news and analysis to help me stand out in the field, communicated in words even a dog could understand."

"In the ABA Journal's competition for the favorite Blawg 100 blog in the Tort category, there's really only one choice:  Jackson on Consumer Class Actions and Mass Torts," Mr. Bear advised.  "Only one other blog -- Eric Turkewitz's -- even has a celebrity endorser, and it's Paris Hilton.  Please!  Even a dog can distinguish between plastic and the real deal, and we know from too many seasons of watching cable TV how she goes through BFFs.  She'll forget your vote tomorrow, if she hasn't already forgotten the endorsement."

"And I'd steer clear of those folks at Abnormal Use, too.  I've sniffed them, and they smell kind of funny, which is not unlike many of their blog posts." Mr. Bear confided.  "Besides, Jackson has promised me one piece of chicken jerky for each vote he gets between now and December 30.  So vote early and often for Jackson!"

You can find voting instructions and a list of other useful tort-related blogs here.  And you can find the photo shoot "Mr. Bear Goes to Washington" by clicking on the Photo Diary in the upper right corner of this page and then scrolling back to April 20-24, 2010.

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ABA Journal Editors Name This Blog to Their "Blawg 100"

Blogging is a solitary endeavor.  Aside from the occasional e-mail or comment from a reader, you'd almost never know anyone was actually reading your posts.  For the blogger, it's much more about -- dare I say it? -- the therapy of setting the words out on the page than it is about what happens afterward.

You can imagine, then, how utterly unsettling it was for me to receive a bulk e-mail a few nights ago informing me that this blog had been named to the ABA Journal's "Blawg 100."  At first I had to check and see if it was legit, as I have more than a few friends at work who relish sending fake e-mails and signing me up for those infernal coupon e-mail blasts from Chevy's.  But it checked out.  I'm in.

Apparently that means that for the month of December I'm a participant in something akin to the Homecoming King competition, where people vote for their "favorite" blog in various categories.  My category is Torts.  

(I always hated those competitions -- no doubt because I never won them.  Well, that's not totally true; I was Student Body President of my rural high school.  But I never got a crown for that!)

Eric Turkewitz, a fellow nominee, seems to have figured out a way to have fun with this contest.  He has quite an endorsement from his campaign manager, Paris Hilton.  With his excellent example, I intend to have some fun with this as well, launching my campaign next week.

The whole point of the "Blawg 100," as I can discern it, is to recognize and inform people about some bloggers who are really doing it right.  For example, I'm honored to be in the torts category with Jim Beck and his Dechert colleagues at Drug and Device Law.  It was their example, and a conversation with "blogger emeritus" there, Mark Herrmann, that got me blogging in the first place.  They do some of the most in-depth analysis of tort issues out there.

And I'm a big fan of fellow nominee Abnormal Use, which has a smart, fun, and dare I say quirky take on the tort issues of the day.  The FDA Law Blog also provides comprehensive coverage of its subject.

The plaintiff-oriented bloggers who are nominated are truly excellent as well:  Turkewitz, The Pop Tort, the Marler Blog, Boston Personal Injury Lawyer Blog,   

But I'm a defense lawyer who litigates consumer class actions, products liability, and mass torts.  And given the breadth of topics and sheer number of legal blogs, the ABA Journal's limitation of its list to 100 means that there are folks I read every day who are not on their list.  In the spirit of the Blawg 100, here are some other bloggers who really do it right in our field, and whom I think you should be reading daily (if you aren't already):

Andrew Trask at Class Action Countermeasures -- He eschews "newsiness" for insightful analysis of more fundamental issues.  And I'm reading his new book on class action strategy, which is excellent.

Sean Wajert at Mass Tort Defense -- Sean has keen analysis of recent developments in our field.  And I have to get up pretty early in the morning to beat him to a case.

All of the folks at the Product Liability Monitor -- It takes a village (or really the whole products liability department at Weil Gotshal & Manges) to crank out all of the helpful news about new cases, regulatory and legislative developments that are covered so comprehensively by this blog.

The profs at the Mass Tort Litigation Blog -- They do a really good job of keeping their readers up to date with both case developments and scholarly articles.

The profs at the Torts Profs Blog -- They, too, do a great job.  They have a guest blogger feature on Mondays that is really interesting, and a newsy round-up on Fridays.

Walter Olson at Overlawyered -- Although his scope is much broader than just torts, he has some excellent news and insights in our field.

Ted Frank at Point of Law -- Ted, too, has a much broader scope than just torts, but is an excellent source of tort news.  He also pays close attention to class action settlements and cy pres recovery.

The folks at The Legal Pulse -- The Washington Legal Foundation has a broader scope than torts, but they frequently offer some detailed analyses of tort and class action issues that are right on the money.

Hopefully this list includes one or two blogs that you may not have been aware of, but will now work into your morning routine.  You'll be glad you did.  And be sure to look through the entire Blawg 100 for still more excellent blogs on a broad range of legal topics.

And now, without further adieu, here are the instructions on how to vote for this blog in Torts category of the ABA Journal's Blawg 100, thereby earning me the crown I've been coveting since high school:

First, you must register to vote.  Don't worry.  They only want your e-mail address and for you to set a username and password.  No phone number.  No firstborn child.  No Nigerian bank account numbers.

And you don't have to be an ABA member or pay dues!  This is representation WITHOUT taxation, if you will.  (And how often can you say that of the ABA?)

Once you've registered, they'll send a link to your e-mail that you must click on to activate.  Then go to the Blawg 100 and select Torts out of the horizontal list of twelve categories (in brown).  Scroll down to view the nominees, and click "vote" next to your favorite blog. 

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Sorry for the Interruption in Postings

I've been remiss in posting and owe you an apology.  The crush of travel, court appearances and filings got to me and I was simply too swamped to post.  I tried a guest blogger -- many thanks to Rob Herrington, who did a fine job.  (Incidentally, he is now a shareholder at Greenberg Traurig in Los Angeles and can be reached here.)  But ultimately, I didn't keep up with the usual pace of posts.

At least I ended up in Alaska (arguing a motion in Anchorage) during my travels, which allows me to now share with you some fun photos from my sightseeing flight over Mt. McKinley.  We even landed on a glacier!

But keep coming back over the days ahead, as I intend to make up for my neglect of regular readers with even more posts than usual.  There have been lots of interesting decisions lately, and there's much to write about.  My "blog decisions briefcase" is getting heavy and needs to be thinned out.

Here's to a busy, productive, healthy and prosperous Fall for all of us!

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Photos from the Tall Ship Lynx

For the remainder of the week and through the Memorial Day holiday, the photos on this blog will be of the tall ship Lynx, a replica of a privateer ship that plied the Chesapeake in the early 1800s.  Last weekend the schooner sailed into Sag Harbor.  But for the last ten years, she has sailed up and down the West Coast, instructing children and adults on the importance of such ships in the War of 1812.  Presently, she is on her way to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Rockport, Maine, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, before spending a summer sailing the Great Lakes.  You can follow her progress here.

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Colorado Court Finds Personal Jurisdiction over Chinese Manufacturer

Not long ago I published an article on personal jurisdiction, explaining the tension between courts that believe it is sufficient for a foreign manufacturer to place the product in the stream of commerce, and those that require something more:  some form of purposeful availment of the forum's laws and benefits.

Last week the Colorado Court of Appeals was faced with a case that presented these issues.  The trial court had concluded that the Chinese manufacturer of an electric meter that exploded in Colorado, injuring a Colorado resident, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  See Etchieson v. Central Purchasing, No. 09CA0218, Slip op. (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010).

The Court of Appeals noted that what constitutes "purposeful availment of the forum" is an open question.  It walked through the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in World Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, as well as the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Court, 532 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1975), in which the court found that because it was foreseeable that the subject ski pants would be sold and used in Colorado, personal jurisdiction was proper.

The Court of Appeals ultimately did not decide what the appropriate test for personal jurisdiction was, instead finding that even under Justice O'Conner's most stringent "stream of commerce plus" test, jurisdiction was proper in this case.  The Chinese manufacturer, Precision, sold the meters to a California company, Central Purchasing.  Precision put Central Purchasing's branding on the products and packaged them for sale in the United States.  It knew that Central Purchasing sold the meters throughout the United States.  It helped arrange for shipping of the goods to California and South Carolina for distribution throughout the United States.  Precision also advertised its own meters in U.S. publications with a national reach.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that these facts did not represent purposeful availment of Colorado's laws and benefits:

[S]imply because these activities were directed toward the United States market generally rather than toward the Colorado market exclusively did not make Precision's availment of the benefits of the Colorado market any less purposeful. 

Neither Asahi nor any other precedent requires a court to exclude from consideration a nonresident defendant's actions relating to a forum simply because those actions also constituted availment of other forums.  To the contrary, as other courts have determined, it is proper to consider contacts with the United States market as a whole in assessing whether a defendant had established minimum contacts with a particular state.

Indeed, excluding regional or national contacts in considering minimum contacts in product liability cases could allow any foreign-nation manufacturer that marketed and sold its products throughout the United States to avoid being haled into a state court anywhere in the country, thus impairing the states' ability to protect their respective citizens from injury from defective products, simply by refusing to tailor its product specifically to any state.

Slip op. at 12-14 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Precision was constitutionally permissible.

The Mr. Bear Goes to Washington Series

Last weekend my firm held a series of meetings in Washington, DC.  My dog, Mr. Ted E. Bear, decided to tag along and explore the city while I attended meeting after soporific meeting.  Each day this week, the photo diary will feature a highlight from Mr. Bear's excellent adventures in DC.

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Torts Twits of the Month: NY Assembly Members Ortiz, Markey, and Perry

I'm instituting a new feature on the blog this month:  "Torts Twit of the Month."  Each month I'll name someone who has done something exceptionally ridiculous in the field of torts be our Twit of the Month.  Who knows, if it catches on, perhaps we can vote for our favorite Torts Twit of the Year!

The idea came to me as I read about the legislation featured below.  To be candid, I'm not at all sure that I'll be able to keep up a Torts Twit of the Month feature.  Most folks who do things that I disagree with in the field of torts are motivated by a legitimate reason.  I may not agree with it, but I wouldn't go so far as to call them a twit.  Biased, maybe.  Wrong even.  But not a twit.

But every once in a while you come across some bozo who is just soooo far out there that he just cries out for recognition of some kind.  Here are their stories.

Three members of the New York Assembly make up our first recipients of the Torts Twit of the Month honors.  This great triumvirate sponsors legislation to ban New York restaurants from cooking with salt.

Yes, you read that right:  BAN New York restaurants from COOKING with ANY salt WHATSOEVER! 

This salty troika's bill would empower the Attorney General -- who surely has better things to do -- to go to court to enjoin restaurants that violate the salt ban "without requiring proof that any person has, in fact, been injured or damaged thereby."  The bill also would allow civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each instance of a restaurant's use of salt in meal preparation.    

Salt, of course, is the oldest known food additive.  It enhances other tastes, so that sweets taste sweeter and bitters less bitter.  Salt is used in everything from eggs to soups to baked goods.  It even acts as a preservative in my favorite Easter ham.

Which is what makes it so darn ridiculous that our March Torts Twits want to ban it entirely from restaurants.  These elected officials are no doubt motivated by a desire to improve public health by lowering our salt intake.  They may even have compelling personal stories about family experiences with health issues caused by the overconsumption of salt.

But that does not excuse the sheer hubris of this trio of local politicos in deciding for the rest of New Yorkers that they shall never have salt in a restaurant meal again.  That's no way to approach a public health problem.  Education?  Sure.  Public information campaigns?  You bet.  Targeted interventions by medical professionals?  Absolutely.

But for the arrogance to assume the power to tell New Yorkers what we can and can't eat in our increasingly expensive restaurants, these three Assembly members have jointly earned the title of Torts Twits of the Month:

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Assemblyman Felix Ortiz

District 51 (Brooklyn)

Salt Ban Sponsor

 

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Assemblywoman Margaret M. Markey

District 30  (Queens)

Salt Ban Co-Sponsor

 

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Assemblyman N. Nick Perry

District 58 (Brooklyn)

Salt Ban Multi-Sponsor

 

The Alabama Supremes Hold That Two Is Not Better Than One

Is it fair for a plaintiff to sue the same defendant twice for the same thing?  Of course not!  But what legal redress is available to a defendant who is sued twice by the same plaintiff?  In Alabama, at least, the answer is now mandamus as a result of Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 2010 WL 335646 (Ala. Jan. 29, 2010). 

In Estes, a railroad filed suit in federal court in Alabama against property owners who allegedly caused a fire that burned down a wooden bridge over a waterway.  Two days later, the railroad filed an identical suit in Alabama state court "'to preserve a forum to litigate its claims in the event the federal action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction more than two years after the fire.'"  Id. at *1 (quoting the railroad's brief).

The defendants moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and then they moved to dismiss the state court action under Alabama's abatement statute, which provides:

No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two actions in the courts of this state at the same time for the same cause and against the same party.  In such a case, the defendant may require the plaintiff to elect which he will prosecute, if commenced simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a good defense to the latter if commenced at different times.

Ala. Code sec. 6-5-440.  (Numerous cases have interpreted the phrase "the courts of this state" to include federal courts in Alabama, as well as state courts.)

The state trial court refused to dismiss the state action, choosing instead to stay it pending resolution of the federal action.  The railroad petitioned for a writ of mandamus.  During the intervening time period, the federal court dismissed the federal case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the railroad had appealed that decision.

The Alabama Supreme Court began by explaining the long common law history of its abatement statute, which stretches all the way back to 15th Century England and stems from the common law maxim that (interpreted from the Latin) provides:  "No man ought to be twice troubled or harassed for one and the same cause."  Estes, 2010 WL 335646 at *2.  At common law, a defendant subject to two identical lawsuits could prevail on a plea in abatement -- the predecessor to the motion to dismiss -- because the second lawsuit was, as a matter of law, vexatious and "ill ab initio."  Abatement was dismissal, not a stay.

Alabama had some class action authority suggesting that where two identical class actions were pending at the same time, the second should be stayed pending resolution of the first.  But the Alabama Supreme Court noted in Estes that this prior authority was not based on the abatement statute, and held that to the extent it suggested a stay was proper under the abatement statute, it was incorrect.

The "stay" should not be an option to be exercised at the discretion of the judiciary because:

the principle codified by the statute "is founded upon the policy of discouraging a multiplicity of suits--of protecting the defendant from oppression, [and] from the grievance of double vexation for the same cause or thing."  "When a defendant is twice impleaded by the same plaintiff, for the same thing, the oppression and vexation is not matter of fact; it is a conclusion of law, and is not dependent upon an inquiry into the actual circumstances of the two cases."

"The institution of the second action" is, in itself, an "offense or wrong, so to speak."  The "offense or wrong" that the statute seeks to prevent consists in the very "existence simul et semel" of the second action.  The wrong committed "'was vexatious and ill ab initio." . . .

. . . "There can be no necessity for the institution or the pendency of two suits for the same matter at the same time.  The security of the plaintiff cannot require it."  If the first action is "defective, it is the fault of the plaintiff, not of the defendant."  Indeed, recognizing a stay of the second action as an acceptable option, pending the outcome of the first, would not only encourage forum shopping, but also "'would encourage and cultivate a want of due care in making the first one effectual.'"  Even if the later filed action is stayed, the defendant remains obligated to stand before both courts prepared to defend against the same cause.

[The railroad] essentially concedes that it had reservations about the viability of its federal action and that it sought to hedge its bet by filing the state action.  This is precisely the evil the statute aims to prevent. 

Id. at *5 - *6 (citations omitted).

The decision in Estes should go a long way in preventing plaintiffs from filing multiple actions to pick among the judges they draw or to hedge their bets when they doubt federal jurisdiction will lie.  Indeed, it's important to note that when mandamus issued in Estes, the federal action already had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and yet the Alabama Supremes held that the later-filed state court action nevertheless must be dismissed.

Various Defenses Should Make Cell Phone Suit Untenable

You may not know it, but I'm famous!  Well, not really famous -- but I was mentioned in the New York Times yesterday.  And well, it wasn't really me, but my doppelganger.  They screwed my name up, calling me "Jackson Russell."  Nevertheless, there I was, sort of, being part of an article about a woman who has sued a mobile phone manufacturer and a mobile service provider because, according to the three-page complaint, they "failed to properly warn of the hazard of cell phone use while driving that created a reasonably foreseeable risk of an accident," allegedly resulting in an accident that killed the plaintiff's mother.  The plaintiff has sued in Oklahoma state court for compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $10 million.

My brief mention in the article was on the common knowledge defense.  It is commonly known that using a handheld mobile phone without a hands-free device increases the risk of accidents.  Manufacturers warn about it in the product literature.  Service providers post billboards about it.  Governmental authorities and public interest groups erect signs warning against it.  And most notably, it is illegal, and all licensed drivers are charged with knowledge of that law.  On this point, tort law is clear:  one has no duty to warn of a commonly known hazard.  And what sort of warning would possibly alter the behavior of the driver who insists on using a hand-held mobile phone while possessed of the common knowledge about the risks?  Simply put, there is none.

Interestingly, the Times reporter actually spoke with the driver of the truck that collided with the plaintiff's mother, who had pled guilty to negligent homicide.  The driver does not blame the mobile phone company, and is quoted as saying:  "It's our choice if we're going to talk on the cellphone while driving or walking down the street or in the office."

The article about the Oklahoma lawsuit appeared with a much larger article in the author's "Driven to Distraction" series, entitled "Promoting the Car Phone, Despite Risks."  This article reads like a plaintiff's complaint, attempting to establish "who knew what when" and pairing the history of marketing for early mobile phones called "car phones" and the scientific research about the risks of distracted driving.  It continually suggests that using hands-free devices does not eliminate the risk of using mobile phones while driving because the problem is "the distraction that comes from focusing on a conversation, not the road."  (Of course the same could be said for conversations with passengers, as well as the distraction that results from eating fast food, drinking beverages, singing along with the radio, putting on make-up or operating an electric razor while driving.)  The article mentions critics who demand "placing overt warnings on the packaging and screens of cellphones."  But in the end, drivers are charged by law with the duty to operate their vehicles responsibly and focusing on the road, regardless of the potential activity that may distract them, and regardless of whether they are "warned" to do so.

In light of the larger Times article, I thought it might be useful to offer more analysis of such claims, rather than my doppelganger's mere mention of the common knowledge doctrine.  To begin with, it would be tough for the plaintiff in a case such as this to establish a legal duty running from the phone manufacturer -- and particularly the service provider -- to someone other than their customer.  A product seller does not owe a duty to the world, and particularly where the product has functioned properly and injury has resulted only from the purchaser's misuse of the product, there can be no duty imposed on the product seller.  This is true in cases where firearm manufacturers are sued for injuries caused to third parties from criminal activity, and it presumably would be true if a plaintiff sued McDonald's for causing driver distraction by selling a billboard-advertised "extra value" meal to a driver from the "drive-thru" window.

Similarly, any duty running from the product seller to the purchaser who injures himself driving while using a hand-held mobile phone may be extinguished in many states by the illegal acts doctrine, which basically holds that a person who injures himself performing an illegal activity may not sue to recover for injuries incurred during that illegal activity.

Moreover, finding a viable cause of action will be difficult for mobile phone plaintiffs as well.  There are two basic product liability theories that could be asserted in these cases:  (1) design defect, and (2) failure to warn.  The design defect claim hardly seems plausible.  Although the "Promoting the Car Phone" article describes one engineer who suggested in the 1960s that there be a lock on the dial to prevent dialing while driving, the simple fact is that it would be difficult to posit a feasible alternative design that did not also detract from the benefits of having a mobile phone in the car.  It is recognized that mobile phones contribute to automobile safety by allowing us to report dangerous driving and accidents, obtain emergency roadside repairs, and receive directions in unfamiliar locations without consulting maps.  Indeed, there have been lawsuits against some automobile manufacturers seeking to impose liability for not having digital mobile assistance capabilities in their cars, and one Oklahoma court even refused to dismiss a cause of action against a mobile service provider who failed to provide a customer with triangulation information to help locate the customer's mother, who had disappeared on the way to the doctor and, allegedly as a result of the delay in locating her, lost the opportunity for rescue and medical attention.  See Frey v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2008 WL 4415328 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).

As I previously noted, the failure to warn theory would be difficult not only because of common knowledge about the risks of using hand-held mobile phones while driving, but also because the mobile phone manufacturers already include such warnings in their product literature. 

Actual causation and proximate causation also would be extremely difficult to prove.  What kind of warning actually would change the conduct of a driver who, in this day and age, insists on using a hand-held mobile phone while driving?  And given the remoteness of the manufacturer and the service provider from the injured plaintiff -- and the intervening illegal conduct of the driver -- can there be causation as a matter of law?

The few cases to have addressed the question squarely answer the question in the negative.  For example, in Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. App. 2004), a plaintiff sued a mobile phone company for giving its customer a mobile phone that the customer was using when he collided with the plaintiff.  The court first concluded that there was no relationship between the mobile phone company and the plaintiff that would give rise to a legal duty on the company to protect the plaintiff.  Moreover, even though many states were adopting statutes that made driving while using a hand-held mobile phone illegal, the court held that there was no foreseeability:

Although we agree that it may be foreseeable that a person who is using a cellular phone while driving might be in an accident, we do not agree with the leap in logic Williams urges us to make that it is likewise foreseeable to a legally significant extent that the sale of the phone would result in an accident.  A cellular phone does not cause a driver to wreck a car.  Rather, it is the driver's inattention while using the phone that may cause an accident.  Drivers frequently use cellular phones without causing accidents, and, of course, cellular phones are used in all sorts of places other than in vehicles.  We do not conclude that there was a high degree of foreseeability that the sale of the phone would result in an accident.

 Id. at 478 (citation omitted).

The court went on to consider where public policy requires placing the responsibility for safe driving:

Simply because an action may have some degree of foreseeability does not make it sound public policy to impose a duty.  For example, many items may be used by a person while driving, thus making the person less attentive to driving.  It is foreseeable to some extent that there will be drivers who eat, apply make up, or look at a map while driving and that some of those drivers will be involved in car accidents because of the resulting distraction.  However, it would be unreasonable to find it sound public policy to impose a duty on the restaurant or cosmetic manufacturer or map designer to prevent such accidents.  It is the driver's responsibility to drive with due care.  Similarly, Cingular cannot control what people do with the phones after they purchase them.  To place a duty on Cingular to stop selling cellular phones because they might be involved in a car accident would be akin to making a car manufacturer stop selling otherwise safe cars because the car might be negligently used in such a way that it causes an accident.

. . . Ultimately, sound public policy dictates that the responsibility for negligent driving should fall on the driver.  Legislation has already been drafted to address the issue of cellular phone use while driving and to place the responsibility on the driver to refrain from doing so.  We are confident that the legislature is taking appropriate measures to protect public safety, and that is both its right and duty.

Id. at 478-79; see also Steele v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 2007 WL 2456104 (Cal. App. Aug. 30, 2007) (describing trial court's demurrer on plaintiff's claim that mobile phone provider owed a duty to plaintiff, who was injured in an accident allegedly caused by the provider's customer while talking on a mobile phone).

At the end of the day, I don't expect lawsuits against mobile phone companies for traffic-related harm to gain much traction.  The problems with duty, foreseeability, and causation are simply too great to make this a lucrative area for litigation.  The simple fact is that there are many potential distractions for drivers:  fast food, beverages, the radio, electronic billboards, and mobile phones, just to name a few.  But the legal responsibility for driving safely and avoiding dangerous distractions rests with the driver, and as a matter of public policy it simply makes no sense to impose on product manufacturers liability that would simply be passed through to their customers in the form of increased prices.

The "Fix" Is In -- Plaintiffs' Bar Has New Vehicle To Reverse Iqbal

Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the courtroom, word comes from BNA's U.S. Law Week that the plaintiffs' bar is supporting a new bill by New York Democrat Jerry Nadler (H.R. 4115) that not only would reverse Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), but would write Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41 (1957) into law and thereby reverse a number of statutes -- including, presumably, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act -- that have self-contained pleading standards.  See 78 U.S.L.W. 2304.

HR 4115 -- the so-called "Open Access to Courts Act of 2009" -- has been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which is set to take quick action on it.  John Conyers, the Committee chair, is a co-sponsor of the bill.  The bill provides:

Sec. 2078.  Limitation on dismissal of complaints

(a) A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.  A court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) govern according to their terms except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section or by amendments made after such date to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Judicial Conference under this chapter.

This bill, if passed, would fundamentally alter the burden of pleading (and, presumably, proof) so that the plaintiff apparently would no longer bear the burden of establishing his or her own entitlement to be in federal court.  Even where his or her pleading was obviously factually deficient -- in that it failed to plead facts supporting the basic elements of the legal claim -- the court would be forced to hypothesize if there might be some factual scenario that could support the cause of action and, if so, the court would be forced to keep the case and allow it to proceed to costly and burdensome discovery, even if such facts did not exist or were not ultimately true.

What is particularly troubling is the sneaky way in which the bill seeks to override all prior legislation that imposed special requirements on suit -- such as the PSLRA -- by making this new pleading rule apply across the board, except where subsequently preempted by statute.

No doubt there will be hearings conducted on H.R. 4115 and its potentially disastrous effects on the civil justice system in short order.  Let's hope the witness lists are more balanced than the last hearings conducted by the Senate on Senator Specter's draft bill.

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