West Virginia Jury Pool Too Opinionated to Seat a Jury in a Tobacco Trial

One of my news clipping services brought me this fascinating tidbit from The West Virginia Record:  after 3 days of trying to empanel a jury in a massive liability trial over cigarettes, the court simply gave up.  It had gone through 650 prospective jurors and only qualified 6 for potential service.  According to the article, "Lawyers excused a woman who said people have no right to sue over diseases that are disclosed on the warning label of a package."  Funny, I would have liked her on my jury.

The court will try again in June, this time with a panel of 2,000 prospective jurors.

The article's description of the trial raises some constitutional questions, too.  Apparently one jury would participate in the liability trial, and if it finds the defendants liable, a second jury would be empaneled for a damages trial.  Seventh Amendment, anyone?  (Or at least, as my colleague Hayden Coleman correctly points out, its state constitutional equivalent?)

Cy Pres Distribution Goes to the Dogs

Every once in a while, I read an opinion that is so surprising that I have to stop and say, "Where's Allen Funt?!  I must be on Candid Camera!"  This is one of them:  In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 2010 WL 60955 (D. P.R. Jan. 7, 2010).

Frankly, I printed this decision and put it in my "to read" pile for the name alone.  The litigation over the Dupont Plaza fire, which killed almost 100 guests in 1987, was one of the defining mass torts when I was a greenhorn.  I wondered as I printed the decision what could possibly be going on in that case more than 20 years since the fire.

It turns out that the court has distributed all of the settlement funds that it can, but there are still some class members or their heirs who cannot be located.  In fact, the court is sitting on $126,977.49 of unclaimed funds.  This decision shuts the books on the litigation and disburses the remaining funds.

How, you might ask?  Well, first the court makes itself comfortable that it can ignore the unclaimed property statutes.  Sitting in equity over a pot of class action proceeds, the court decides that it can disburse the money as it sees fit, without having the funds escheat to the government.  Id. at *1.

Then, it introduces the cy pres doctrine, which originally was created by courts presiding over trusts where achieving the original purpose was no longer possible.   The good folks over at Drug and Device Law previously have posted an excellent discussion of why cy pres recovery is incompatible with class action litigation.  Nevertheless, the court in the Dupont Hotel Fire was determined to use the cy pres doctrine to distribute the money remaining in its coffers. 

As Judge Raymond Acosta observed, "cy pres" actually means "as near as possible."  Id.  So what "as near as possible" charity did Judge Acosta pick to receive the unclaimed settlement funds from the hotel fire litigation? 

Was it, perhaps, the National Fire Protection Association -- a non-profit organization that, since 1889, has been advocating consensus fire codes and standards and promoting fire education?  Maybe the International Association of Fire Chiefs, which helps educate and advocate for career and volunteer fire safety personnel?  The American Red Cross, which provides domestic disaster relief in situations like hotel fires?  The Disaster Relief Fund at the Corporation for National and Community Service, which coordinates volunteers from across the country to assist in disaster relief efforts in response to fires?  Or even a local fire service organization or disaster relief organization in Puerto Rico? 

None of the above.  Instead, the nearly $127,000 went to . . .

The Animal Legal Defense Fund

Notably, the court appeared to expect criticism for not giving the money to a charity in Puerto Rico, and conceded that its distribution may not have been the best one:

[W]e conclude that, while use of funds for purposes closely related to their origin might be the best application, the cy pres doctrine and the courts' broad equitable powers now permit use of these funds for other public interest purposes by either educational, charitable, or other public service organizations, both for current programs or to constitute an endowment and source of future income for long-range programs.

Id. at *2.  And, the court notes, it had an application from the ALDF asking for the funds.  So, voila!  ALDF -- headquartered in California -- gets the money.

Now don't get me wrong.  I looooove animals.  In fact, here is a gratuitous picture of my dog, Ted:

 

But what the Sam Hill does the ALDF have to do with a hotel fire?!!!  Surely the laudable work done by the ALDF is not "as near as possible" to the purpose of class action funds that were collected to compensate people injured in a hotel fire.

This decision is destined to be cited by some advocates as yet another instance of class action cy pres distribution gone terribly wrong.

Side Note: Delaware Chancery Court Issues Important Opinion on Excess Insurance Coverage for Asbestos Exposure

Although not within the technical bailiwick of this blog, I thought it was worthwhile to point out the Delaware Chancerty Court's recent decision in Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indemnity Co., Civ. A. No. 1465-VCS, Slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2009).  In Viking Pump, two corporate purchasers of a pump manufacturing business sought to use excess insurance coverage previously purchased by the seller to cover asbestos claims for exposures that occurred during the period when the seller owned the business.  The contracts of sale had transferred to plaintfifs the right to make claims.  The policies, however, had sought to prevent such a transfer. 

The court held that New York law overrides the policy provisions preventing post-loss assignments of the right to make a claim.  In other words, where the exposure occurred while the seller owned the business, the subsequent purchasers could bring the claims, regardless of how the contract was worded.  Moreover, the court interpreted the polcies to make the insurer liable for "all sums" of the liability arising from an occurrence during the policy's coverage, including occurrences involving multi-period exposure.  (The insurers had argued for a pro rata method of allocation.)

ONE DAY LEFT TO ENTER RUMPOLE CONTEST

Previously, I challenged my readers to outline the motion to dismiss a class action complaint filed by a disgruntled student who failed to get into the University of Illinois.  Knowing that lawyers do not compete without a prize, I offered the winner a copy of the newly-released book by the late John Mortimer, A RUMPOLE CHRISTMAS:  STORIES.  I am told by Amazon.com that the book is in transit to me even as I type this.

You have only one day left to enter!  At midnight on Halloween my e-mail box will close, and I will judge the entries in a candy-induced mania on Sunday.  You will get to read the winning entry and learn more about the winner on Monday.

Get those entries in quickly!  And have a Boo-tiful weekend.

US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform Releases Important Report on Third-Party Litigation Financing

The US Chamber Institute on Legal Reform released an important report on third-party litigation financing in the United States today, which you can download here.  The report was written by my Skadden colleagues John Beisner, Jessica Miller, and Gary Rubin.

The authors conclude that third-party financing not only increases the volume of litigation generally, but also increases litigation of questionable merit.  They suggest that third-party financing should be banned in aggregate litigation becuase it further dilutes the role of the claimants themselves in such cases.  And they detail Austrailia's experience with third-party litigation financing.

The Eleventh Circuit Says Montreal Convention's Venue Provision Does Not Trump Forum Non Conveniens

One of the first issues I litigated in my career as a mass torts lawyer involved a woman injured while disembarking an aircraft in China.  The primary issue was whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be invoked by an air carrier where the treaty that governs personal injury suits by air passengers, the Montreal Convention -- or, formally, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air -- allows for venue in the United States.  We won.  See Lu v. Air China Int'l Corp., 1992 WL 453646 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1992).  And I received a free trip to China from a grateful client to attend a party in the Great Hall of the People celebrating their corporate restructuring.

It's over 15 years later, and the Eleventh Circuit has just reached the same conclusion:  the Montreal Convention's venue provisions do not preclude the application of forum non conveniens rules.  See Guyard v. Newvac Corp., No. 07-15828, Slip op. (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2009).  I doubt I'll get a free trip to Martinique for writing a blog post about this decision, but you can't blame a guy for trying.

A West Caribbean Airways flight carrying Martinique citizens crashed in the mountains of Venezuela.  Newvac, an American company, had chartered the West Caribbean plane for round-trip flights from Martinique to Panama and had contracted with a travel agency to market them to Martinique residents.

The Montreal Convention has a jurisdictional provision that allows for claims resulting from the death or injury of a passenger to be brought in a variety of countries, including, importantly, the "carrier's" domicile and principal place of business.  Although the Convention's jurisdictional provision does not define the term "carrier," elsewhere the Convention distinguishes between an "actual carrier" and a "contracting carrier," making the contracting carrier subject to the Convention's rules for the "whole of the carriage contemplated in the contract," while the actual carrier is subject to such rules "solely for the carriage which it performs."  Slip op. at 8.  The district court had concluded (and the Eleventh Circuit implicitly affirmed) that under the Montreal Convention, the case could properly be brought in the United States because Newvac was the contracting carrier and this was its domicile and principal place of business.

Newvac, however, moved for forum non conveniens dismissal, arguing that the evidence and witnesses pertaining to damages were in Martinique, and thus suit should be brought there.  Plaintiffs argued that because the Montreal Convention conferred jurisdiction on the United States, the court was bound by the treaty to exercise it and was without the power to use forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction.

Article 33(4) of the Montreal Convention provides that "[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the case."  The Eleventh Circuit held that "forum non conveniens is a 'question of procedure' under U.S. law and thus it clearly falls within the ambit of Article 33(4)."    Slip op. at 10.  Plaintiffs argued that applying forum non conveniens to divest the U.S. of jurisdiction would undermine the purpose of the Convention's jurisdictional provisions.  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that "the purpose of the Convention is adequately safeguarded under traditional forum non conveniens analysis."  Id. at 11.  Because there was no ambiguity or limitation in the express language of Article 33(4), the Eleventh Circuit held that all questions of procedure are governed by the rules of the forum state and a district court may, where appropriate, exercise its discretion to apply forum non conveniens "so long as another Convention jurisdiction is available and can more conveniently adjudicate the claim."  Slip op. at 11-12.

The Eleventh Circuit then moved on to analyze whether the district court abused its discretion in invoking forum non conveniens in this case, analyzing both the private and public interest factors.  No one contested that Martinique was an adequate alternative forum.  Plaintiffs argued, however, that their choice of forum was entitled to deference and the presumption of convenience.  The court noted that such deference is lessened where the plaintiffs are not U.S. residents.  Plaintiffs argued, however, that their choice of forum deserved greater deference than the typical non-resident's because the Convention conferred upon the U.S. jurisdiction over their claims.  The Eleventh Circuit ducked the question of precisely what deference such plaintiffs' choice is due, concluding that "the analysis cannot end with a presumption of convenience, but must address the actual convenience of the various available fora." 

The court noted that the greater deference given a U.S. resident's choice of forum stems from the assumption that she chose her home forum because it was convenient.  That was not the case here, however.  The defendants had conceded liability, so the sole issue at trial was to be damages.  It was undisputed that "all of the witness and documentary evidence regarding damages, as well as all or virtually all of the non-party factual witnesses, are located in Martinique, beyond the compulsory process of the district court."  Slip op. at 15.  Plaintiffs argued that they were willing to bear the extra expense to meet their burden of proof by bringing their evidence to Florida.  But the court noted that this failed to account for the ability of the defendants to prepare their defensive case. 

In analyzing the public interest factors, the court noted that although the U.S. has an interest in deterring the tortious conduct of its citizens, Martinique has a stronger interest in adjudicating actions to redress injuries to its citizens.  Particularly because the damages evidence was in French and was located in Martinique, the public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of Martinique as the forum:

[T]he United States' interest in adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims does not justify the enormous commitment of time -- both of the court and of jurors -- and other judicial resources that would be consumed by the presentation of live testimony and documentary evidence in a foreign language.  Finally, the district court found that although litigating third-party claims . . . would be more convenient in a U.S. forum than in Martinique, the burden of translation in Martinique with respect to these claims is not as great as the burden of presenting French damages evidence in the United States.  This is so because the Martinique court designated to hear Montreal Convention claims does so in writing only and will not hear testimony.  Thus, Defendants will not bear the burden of translating live testimony in Martinique as both parties would in the United States.

Slip op. at 18.

Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the public and private interest factors to dismiss the case in favor of a Martinique forum under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.

WELCOME BACK, BLOGGER!

Well the names have all changed since you hung around,

But those dreams have remained and they're turned around.

Who'd have thought they'd lead ya . . .

Here where we need ya?

Yeah we tease him a lot 'cause we've got him on the spot.

Welcome back.

Welcome back, welcome back, welcome back.

John Sebastian, Welcome Back Kotter (1975).

 

This post marks my return to blogging after a five-month absence.  I suppose I owe you an explanation.  After all, what WAS I doing during all that time?!

I'd like to tell you that I was reprising Gabe Kaplan's role by filming the remake of the "Welcome Back Kotter" series for the CW.

But you're a bright audience, and somehow I doubt you'd believe me.  I don't make a very convincing Gabe Kaplan.

The simple truth is this:  in April I came down with a respiratory infection that, left misdiagnosed, worsened.  I even developed strep throat, which I thought was reserved for 12-year-olds.  I barely had the energy to work and crawl home to bed, where I seemed unable to get enough sleep. 

By the time I recovered sufficiently a few months later, I had lots of work to catch up on, it was summer, and no one was expecting frequent posts from me anymore.  It was nice having all that extra time.  And I got soft. 

But the Recovering Baptist's guilt set in.  Many of you contacted me.  Herrmann and Beck even blogged about my demise.  And I quickly realized that I was a better lawyer when I was blogging, because I was fully on top of recent developments and getting free therapy by sharing with you some of my outrage at these decisions.  Ultimately, by the end of July I had decided that I needed to get back on the horse.  (But, given that it was boating season, I figured I'd wait until Labor Day to begin performance on the back-to-school resolutions.)

So now I'm back, pencils sharpened.  Chastened and somewhat smarter, I hope. 

Here's what you can expect:  at least 3 posts a week on mass torts and consumer class actions topics.  Pictures from New York.  And a substitute blogger should I fall ill again.

New Beisner/Miller Monograph Is Compelling Reading

John Beisner and Jessica Miller have published an excellent new monograph with the Washington Legal Foundation entitled:  "LITIGATE THE TORTS, NOT THE MASS:  A Modest Proposal for Reforming How Mass Torts Are Adjudicated."  They, along with Professor Richard Nagareda of Vanderbilt Law School, do a great job of describing the difficulties presented by mass torts:  because personal injury cases generally are not aggregable into class actions, there are tremendous problems coordinating hundreds (or even thousands) of state and federal tort cases for discovery and trial, as well as effectively buying global peace if (and when) the time comes to actually settle them.

Beisner and Miller propose the following solutions:

1.  Require only minimal diversity for federal jurisdiction over mass torts in which there is an MDL proceeding.

2.  Improve case management by:  (a) expanding the use of fact sheets, (b) requiring all claimants to comply with Lone Pine orders, (c) advancing discovery on randomly-selected subsets of individual claims and then having single-plaintiff bellwether trials, and (d) imposing fee-shifting on counsel who file meritless or fraudulent claims.

3.  Effectively eliminate American Pipe tolling of statutes of limitations in mass tort cases.

4.  Promote global resolution of cases by:  (a) loosening Rule 23's certification requirements for settlement classes, (b) clarifying the ethics rules to make it clear that settlement provisions encouraging client participation and discouraging cherry-picking do not conflict with the attorney's ethical obligations, and (c) mandating pre-suit disclosures by plaintiffs' counsel of the potential conflicts that may arise from representing multiple plaintiffs.