UPDATE: BPA MDL Court Won't Reconsider or Certify Interlocutory Appeal, But Gives Defendants an Early Gift on Class Certification

Last November I posted about two decisions on motions to dismiss issued by Judge Otrie Smith in the MDL involving bisphenol-A ("BPA") in baby bottles, sippy cups and infant formula, which is pending in the Western District of Missouri.  Apparently the "Bottle Defendants" -- who had not received the benefit of federal preemption in Judge Smith's opinion -- moved to reconsider on the breach of warranty and unjust enrichment claims or, in the alternative, certify the issues for interlocutory appeal.  On Tuesday, the court issued an opinion denying the motion.

Growing up in my small Missouri town, I was always an optimist.  Indeed, I was an actual member of the Optimist Club, which began its weekly meetings at the incorrigibly optimistic hour of  6:30 a.m.  I'm prone to viewing the sippy cup as half full, rather than half empty. 

And so you would expect me to be encouraged by this little nugget in Judge Smith's order denying the defendants' motion.  The court acknowledged that its prior order might have been unclear in its discussion of unjust enrichment.  The court had never intended to suggest that all plaintiffs "automatically and necessarily have a valid claim for unjust enrichment."  Slip op. at 2.  Rather, unjust enrichment is an individual issue because of the differences in state laws and in the factual situations of the plaintiffs:

The Court's holding is, essentially, that its "benefit of the bargain" analysis did not affect the unjust enrichment claims because the "benefit of the bargain" does not play a role in the analysis -- at least, for some jurisdictions.  In contrast to the law of warranty (which is somewhat uniform because of the states' adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code), the law of unjust enrichment cannot be confidently described as uniform.  When this observation is coupled with the differing circumstances of each Plaintiff (and potential Plaintiff), the Court cannot conclude that no purchaser can assert a claim for unjust enrichment.  Ultimately, differences in individual circumstances and the content of state laws make it impossible for the Court to hold that all consumers either have or do not have a cause of action as a matter of law.

Id. at 3.

Thus, although the Bottle Defendants don't get a free ride to the Eighth Circuit just yet, Judge Smith has clearly given them a present, as there is no way he can certify an unjust enrichment class consistent with that opinion.

Hit my sippy cup again, bartender!

A California Federal Court Dismisses Computer Class Action

In Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2009 WL 3021240 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009), the court packed a lot of legal issues into a short opinion.

The plaintiff brought a putative class action, claiming that HP's laptop computers have a defect in the power jack's attachment to the motherboard that causes the solder connection to be interrupted, resulting in the ultimate failure of the laptops.  Initially, plaintiff brought the putative class action in state court alleging that an "abnormally high" number of such laptops were defective, and representing that the individual class members' claims were under $75,000 and that the aggregate liability was under $5 million.  Subsequently, they amended the complaint to allege that all HP laptops of certain models had the defect.  HP removed to federal court under CAFA 129 days after the filing of the original complaint, and plaintiff moved to remand.  The court retained jurisdiction, finding that HP had been justified in relying upon the monetary allegations in the initial complaint to refrain from investigating whether the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.

The court also granted defendant's motion to dismiss, giving plaintiffs leave to amend.  Plaintiffs had pled three causes of action:  California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, and breach of warranty.

The court held that the allegations at issue did not impose upon the defendant any duty to disclose under the CLRA, noting that the alleged defect did not involve a risk of physical injury.

It also held that the allegations were insufficient to state a UCL claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Although the complaint alleged violation of ten statutory prohibitions, it gave no facts as to how those prohibitions were violated.  Moreover, the court held that the following statements were non-actionable puffery:  that laptops are designed to "'perform . . . flawlessly,'" that they provide "'easy-to-use technology'" and that they "'enable greater mobility and resource sharing within homes or small offices.'"  Id. at *2.

The court also held that the breach of warranty claim failed because plaintiff's computer failed after the running of the two-year warranty period.  The court rejected plaintiff's argument that a two-year warranty period was unconscionable.

One disappointing bit of dictum in the Wilson decision is the court's statement that, at the pleading stage, California's UCL constitutionally could apply to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs because the defendant's actions and representations are alleged to have emanated from California.  The decision, however, engages in no conflict of laws analysis and fails to consider any of the large number of decisions that refuse to apply the law of the defendant's residence to facilitate a class action.

 

Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Intermediate Seller Wants to Say "No, Thank You" to Release It Received in Manufacturer's Class Settlement

As someone who has drafted his fair share of class action settlements, I can tell you that I always get a little nervous when I start reading a case in which a court is required to construe the language and effect of a prior class action settlement.  I had that same trepidation when I picked up Lester Building Systems v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 2009 WL 537501 (Minn. March 5, 2009).

The plaintiff, Lester Building Systems ("Lester"), makes hog barns, which it sells directly to farmers and indirectly through a network of independent builder-dealers.  In the early 1990s, Lester stopped using plywood in favor of an external siding product called "Inner-Seal," which was made by Louisiana-Pacific.  Around that same time, Louisiana-Pacific started receiving complaints from around the country about its Inner-Seal product swelling and deteriorating.  Eventually, Louisiana-Pacific ended up settling a nationwide class action in federal court that resolved all potential Inner-Seal claims.  The opt-out settlement did not require Louisiana-Pacific to fund the settlement all at once; rather, it was to make annual payments.  The claims ended up far out-pacing Louisiana-Pacific's contributions, and many class members were forced to either accept immediately-reduced payouts on their claims, or wait until such time as Louisiana Pacific could make a full payment.

Lester had bought around $3.4 million of Inner-Seal and used it to make some 2,600 hog barns.  Many of its customers were not happy.  Lester estimated that to repair its customers' barns would cost $13.2 million.  Many of Lester's customers, however, chose an early payout from the settlement fund of only $640,000.

In negotiating the settlement, Louisiana-Pacific -- like many product manufacturers -- had tried to protect not only itself, but also the intermediate sellers of its products by including within the settlement a complete release of liability for them:  "To the extent claims may be asserted against persons or entities in the chain of distribution, installation or finishing of the Exterior Inner-Seal siding, the Releasing Party shall be deemed to and does hereby release and forever discharge those persons or entities from claims based solely on distribution, handling, installation, specification, or use of the Exterior Inner-Seal Siding."  2009 WL 537501 at *5 (quoting the settlement).

Lester was far from grateful for such protection, however.  In fact, it sued Louisiana Pacific in Minnesota state court, asserting theories of breach of contract, breach of implied and express warranties, and fraud.  Lester won at trial handily:  the jury awarded Lester $3.4 million for Lester's purchase price for the Inner-Seal products, $10.2 million for lost profits up through 2002, $2.8 million for the cost of restoring goodwill, and $13.2 million for the estimated cost of repairing its customers' barns.

Louisiana Pacific argued that the cost of repairing Lester's customer's barns was not a proper element of damages because Lester had no legal obligation to conduct such repairs, since it had received a full and complete release from the federal settlement.  Lester countered that even if it did not have a legal obligation to make such repairs, it had a practical business obligation to do so, and Louisiana-Pacific should pay for it. 

The Minnesota Supreme Court examined the language of the federal settlement and held that it clearly and unambiguously released all entities in the chain of distribution -- including Lester -- from liability to repair the farmers' barns.  Moreover, the court held, Lester already had received from the jury awards for lost profits and loss of goodwill, and thus no "practical business obligation" could exist to support the so-called consequential repair costs.  Without Lester having a legal obligation to repair its customers' barns, Lester could not force Louisiana-Pacific to pay for it.

Lester Building Systems is another good decision for my class action settlements file that squarely considers the language of an intermediary release provision and gives it full force and effect.  The irony, of course, is that the release ultimately operated to the detriment of the intermediate seller, who instead wanted to extract money from the manufacturer to pay for repairs to its customers' barns. 

Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Warranty Class Action

The Fourth Circuit recently issued an opinion highlighting the fact that product design often presents trade-offs, and that in comparing one product's performance to another, it is important to recognize those differences in order to preserve consumer choice. 

In Robinson v. American Honda Motor Co., 2009 WL 19132 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 2009), the plaintiff had brought a class action alleging that the tires sold with the Odyssey Touring minivan were defective because they did not last as long as other tires.  This style of minivan came exclusively with Michelin PAX System tires with "run flat" capability:  "If a tire is punctured, the minivan can still be driven at speeds up to 55 mph for a distance of up to 125 miles."  Because of the PAX System's unique wheel-rim and tire combination, no other brand or model of tire will work on the minivan unless the wheels themselves are replaced.

The tire's treads are susceptible to rapid wear from wheel misalignment or mechanical irregularity.  Plaintiff complained that after having the minivan for 18 months and less than 18,000 miles of use, his tires experienced excessive wear on the outside edge of the tread.  He brought a class action against Honda and Michelin for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranties.

The trial court, applying Maryland law, had granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

          Honda's Express Warranty

The car manufacturer had clearly, repeatedly and unambiguously excluded the tires from its limited warranty.  In three places it indicated that the tires were not covered under the warranty and that the tires had their own separate warranty.  The express warranty also stated that a "local representative of the tire's manufacturer" would be responsible for warranty service.

Nevertheless, plaintiff seized on the following statement in the warranty booklet to argue that the tires should be covered:  "By keeping your Honda in top condition, you will be rewarded with years of trouble-free service at the lowest operating cost.  The keys to keeping your Honda in top condition are proper operation and regular maintenance."  Plaintiff argued that because he had had all of the recommended maintenance performed by Honda, his need to replace tires in 18 months violated the promise of "years of trouble free service at the lowest operating cost."

The Fourth Circuit -- noting that the proffered phrase from the booklet was likely mere puffery -- observed that "lowest operating cost" is not "no" operating cost, and it did not cancel the very clear statements in the warranty booklet that the tires were not covered.  Accordingly, the court affirmed dismissal of the express warranty claim against Honda.

          Michelin's Express Warranty

Michelin's warranty covered the tires "against defects in workmanship and materials, for the life of the original useable tread or 6 years from the date of purchase, whichever comes first."  The warranty also had replacement provisions making it clear that the life of the warranty is measured by the life of the tread, not by a period of time or miles.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that there was no warranty whatsoever for tread wear, and thus affirmed dismissal of the express warranty claim.

          Implied Warranty Claims Against Honda and Michelin

UCC 2-314(1) requires that goods, to be merchantable, must "'[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description' and must 'be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.'"

Plaintiff argued that the 18,000 mile tread life of his PAX System tires did not meet the 35,000 mile to 40,000 mile tread life of other tires, and thus his tires were not fit for their ordinary purpose and would not pass without objection in the trade.

The Fourth Circuit recognized, however, that in making comparisons under section 2-314, one must be careful to correctly define the product.  Here, the "product" for comparison was not "tires," but rather a subcategory of that product type:  "run-flat tires."  The court understood that properly defining the product for comparison is the key to preserving consumer choice:

Many different types of tires exist, each with a different purpose, a different design, and a different duration.  Passenger tires, touring tires, high performance tires, all terrain tires, and mud tires are all categories of automobile and light truck tires commonly driven on American roads.  When purchasing a specialized type of tire, consumers often choose to forego the longer tread life of standard passenger tires for special features such as increased grip or handling, a smoother ride, a lower profile, better aesthetics, or increased traction.

. . . Michelin PAX System tires provide a benefit -- increased safety -- at the cost of potentially shorter tread life.  As in the case of performance tires, the merchantability of Michelin PAX System tires cannot be determined by a comparison to standard passenger tires.  Instead, the merchantability of Michelin PAX System tires must be determined by examining whether these tires would "pass without objection in the trade" as run-flat tires.

Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).

The court thus affirmed dismissal of the implied warranty claims because plaintiff did not allege that his tires had a shorter tread life than other run-flat tires. 

Although it is hardly complicated, the decision in Robinson is an important statement of the court's properly limited role in second-guessing issues of product design, and a recognition that a broader reading of implied warranty rules can severely impair consumer choice:

To hold otherwise would require all automobile tires to last as long as the standard passenger tire and would elevate durability above all other considerations in the manufacture and design of tires.  This procrustean standard would severely limit the ability of tire and automobile manufacturers to create the specialized tires that consumers may desire.  The purchaser of a set of tires -- and not the courts -- should be given the power to decide what balance of durability, performance, special features, and safety is best suited to his needs.

Id.